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Abstract
Today, "The Sorites paradox" is used to refer to a class of paradoxical arguments having a
similar form. An example is: A man weighing 100 Ibs. is thin; every man who is thin will
remain thin if he gains an ounce. Therefore, a man weighing 100 lbs. will remain thin if
he gains 400 lbs. What makes the argl1ment paradoxical is that while it seems both to be
valid and to have true premises, it clearly has a false conclusion. It is commonly agreed
that the argument shows that we should not accept the second premise-the principle that
thinness always tolerates the gaining of a mere ounc~. One does not solve the Sorites,
though, just by giving up this "tolerance" principle. In the first chapter of the thesis, I say
what more is required: 1. If the tolerance principle is not true, why are we unable to say
which instance or instances of it are not true?; 2. Why are we so attracted by the tolerance
principle in the first place?; 3. Can we, despite the paradox, maintain the thought that
vague predicates have borderline cases, even though that thought seems to conflict with the
denial of tolerance principles?; 4. Can we, despite the paradox, maintain in some revised
form the thought that if two things are similar enough in a certain respect (say, weight),
they will have the same semantic status with regard to a related vague predicate (in this
case 'thin')?
In the second chapter of the thesis, I present and criticize some going solutions to
the paradox. In particular, I argue that none of these solutions can be regarded as complete,
since none provides an answer to all four of the questions set out in the first chapter. In
the third chapter, I develop my own solution to the Sorites paradox: vague predicates
are radically context-dependent, in the sense that they may express different properties on
different occasions of use; in any context, a vague predicate expresses a property instantiated
by both or neither of two things that are relevantly similar in that context. In this third
chapter I show, on the one hand, how my account of the context-dependence of vague
predicates contains the resources for providing a complete solution to the Sorites; and on
the other hand, how many incomplete solutions could be coherently supplemented with
this account. I conclude the thesis with a fourth chapter, in which I consider versions of
the Sorites paradox thought to arise from the existence of phenomenal continua, and to
which I do not extend the solution developed in chapter tlrree. I argue that phenomenal
continua do not provide a series of the sort required to get the paradox going-that is, a
series of things, each of which looks the same as its neighbor, but not the same as more
distant members of the series. The conclusion of the chapter is disjunctive: either there are
no phenomenal continua, or we have infinite powers of discrimination. Either way, we are
permitted to accept as true the claim that if two things look the same, then if Olle looks
red (for example), then so does the other.
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Title: Professor of Philosophy
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Chapter 1
The Sorites Paradox
Take any heap of sand. If you remove just one grain from it, you will still have a heap.
It seems crazy to deny this-for it seems that a thing could not be a heap unless it were
li:tIge enough to remain a heap if made just slightly smaller. If we accept this, however, we
commit ourselves to the following principle: For any number n, if n + 1 grains of sand can
form a heap then so can n grains. Unfortunately, this seemingly incontrovertible principle
embroils us in paradox:
10,000 grains of sand can form a heap
For any n, if (n + 1) grains of sand can form a heap then so can n grains
Therefore, 1 grain of sand can form a heap
Here we have a valid argument with a false conclusion, and so it cannot be that both
of the premises are true. What makes it a paradox is that both of the premises certainly
see,n true. It is generally agreed that the second premise is the culprit, that our seemillgly
incontrovertible principle is not true. (Following Crispin Wright, we will call the second
prf~mise a principle of tolerance for 'heap'.1) But in order to dispel the paradox, we have to
do more than just point our finger at the guilty premise. What more is required? I provide
l(Wright 1975, 333f.). The idea is that the applicability of 'heap' to a collection of grains of sand could
always survive, or tolerate, a unit decrease.
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an answer to. this question in the second section of this chapter. First, however, I wish to
consider the general question of what it is to solve a paradox. On the one hand, this will
provide us with a useful frame of reference when we proceed to discuss what is required
of a solution to the Sorites in particular. On the otller hand, by looking at a few other
paradoxes, I aim to demonstrate that the general question has no answer, and hence that
it cannot be taken for granted that it is obvious what the answer to the particular question
is. It is my view that all attempted solutions to the Sorites paradox suffer from a failure to
identify at the outset what questions are being provided answers.
1.1 Solving Paradoxes
What are we to do when confronted with a paradox? Set out to solve it, of course. But
what is it to "solve" a paradox? I am tloable to find a univocal answer to this question. It
seems that what counts as solving a paradox varies widely from case to case, since not all
paradoxes are created equal. Consider the care-taker paradox:
There seems no harm in supposing that for any property a person might have,
it would be \l()~s\b\e {or someone to tate care of ~\l~t thocoe \\eo\lle ~\\() ha~e, that
property. So tnere seems no harzn in supposing it possible that Kind Kate takes
care of just those people who do not take care of themselves. Now does Kind
Kate take care of herself or not? Well, if she does she doesn't and if she doesn't
she does. So we are in a bind, because that's not possible.
It's not much of a bind, though. We "solve" this paradox just by giving up our initial
universal principle ("For any property a person might have ... "), which may be called an
abstraction principle for care-takers. There is no psychological barrier to giving up the
principle-as there is in the case of the tolerance principle-since the care-taker paradox,
far from leaving us puzzled, shows us why we should give up the abstraction principle by
handing us precisely that instance of it (the property of not taking care of oneself) \vhich
gets us into trouble.
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Something similar may be said for the Liar paradox. The starting principle is this:
For any indicative sentence p, 'p' is true if and only if p.2 (We will call this a disquotation
principle for truth.) But consider the Liar sentence: 'The Liar sentence is not true'. Now
is this sentence true or not? Given the disquotation principle plus the identity of the Liar
sentence and 'The Liar sentence is not true" we quickly conclude that the Liar is true if
and only if it's not true. Thus we must give up our ini~..al universal principle and, as with
the care-taker paradox, the present paradox shows us why. The Liar paradox, like the
care-taker paradox, but unlike the Sorites paradox, not only demonstrates that its starting
universal principle cannot be true, it also provides us with a trouble-making instance, and
hence a way of seeing that its starting universal principle is not '·rue.
But still, there is an important contrast between the Liar and the care-taker: we do
not solve the Liar paradox just by giving up the disquotation principle, in the way that we
solve the care-taker paradox just by giving up the abstraction principle. One reason for this
contrast in what's to count as a solution is that the disquotation principle seems to have a
fundamental status as reflecting our understanding of what truth is. If we merely relinquish
the principle, we relinquish that understanding. Thus part of what's required to solve t~e
Liar is to investigate and propose consistent alternatives to the disquotation principle; to
say what relationship any such alternative bears to our original understanding of truth; or
else to argue, though this seems desperate, that we had no coherent understanding of truth,
or worse, that there is no coherent notion of truth to be made out. Because the abstrac-
tion principle for care-takers has no similarly fundamental status for our understanding of
anything, abandoning the principle imposes on us no further philosophical burden.
There might be a second reason for the contrast between the Liar and the care-
taker: a reason deriving from a difference in the extent to which the two paradoxes lead
\lB to question classical principles of reasoning. Let me explain. Letting 'k' stand for Kate,
'R' for the takes care of relation, and 'L' for the Liar sentence, i.e. '...,7r(L)', we cannot
2In order for my formulation of the principle to be well-formed, the universal quantifier must be under-
stood as a substitutional onei for it to be plausible, the pair of quotation mark, around the substitutional
variable must be understood as a term-forming functor.
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accept that kRk iff -,kRk or that 1t('-{Ir(L)') iff -,1T(L), since these are inconsistent;
and because they are inconsistent, it seems we should accept their negations, which are
classically equivalent to instances of the Law of Excluded Middle, namely, to 'kRk V -,kRk'
and '1t(L) V -,1T(L)', respectively.3 Now in the case of Kind Kate, it is not hard to accept
that she either takes care of herself or ~he doesn't, because it is not h~.d to see how one
or the other disjunct could be true. But in the case of the Liar, ;t is hard to accept that
it is either true or it isn't, because it is very hard to see how it could be the one, or how
it could be the ot.her. Surely, we should reason, the Liar cannot be true, for if it were true
then since it says that it is not true, it wouldn't be. But conversely, it is difficult to accept
that the Liar is not true because then, it seems, we would be accepting the Liar itself, and
would that not just be to accept the Liar as true? Maybe not-maybe we could learn to
live with the idea that the Liar, after all, is not true. But short of doing that, we must let
go of some of our classical principles. The problem posed by the Liar is to say which, if
any, should give.
In another sort of case, just identifying the fallacy involved in a paradox would count
as providing a solution to it. I have in mind, as an example, the paradox of the surprise
examination:
A teacher informs his class that at some point during the next month, a surprise
examination will be given. The students decide that, having been so informed,
no such examination can be given. They reason as follows: the exam cannot be
on the last day, for then we would know on the night before that there would
be an exam the following day, and hence it would not be a surprise. But then it
cannot be on the second to last day either, for then, knowing the exam cannot
be on the last day, we would know on the night before the second to last day
that there would be an exam the following day, and hence it would not be a
surprise. TIJey reason similarly for each of the remaining days, continuing in
reverse order. But then, come the twelfth day, the teacher passes out an exam
and, 10 and behold, the students are surprised. What, if anything, was wrong
with their reasoning?
3For the equivalence of '7r(L) V -.7r(L) , and the negation of '7rC-{lr(L) I) ++ -,7r(L)', we make use of the
identity of L and '-.n-(L)'.
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In the case of the care-taker and Liar paradoxes there could be no question that
the abstraction and disquotation principles were the source of contradiction, since the rea-
soning required to get from these principles to contradiction was so meager, explicit, and
unimpeachable.4 With the surprise exam paradox, however, the reasoning is more com-
plex, more 811btle-it is not ~lear just what principles are involved-and, moreover, it is not
strictly logical. It suffices to solve the surprise exam paradox if one identifies the principles
involved in the students' reasoning, and says which of those principles is flawed. Of course
by this, I do not mean that it is sufficient, having identified the principles involved, merely
to state which principle is flawed .. One must offer a reasoned defense of the claim--one must
explain why the flawed principle may not be employed in the envisioned circumstances. It
could in the end turn out that the surprise exam paradox is like the Liar paradox in the
respect that it could just be that the flawed principle employed by the students (whichever
one it is) is so fundamental to our understanding that, like the disquotation principle, it
could not be given up without saying what is to replace it. But that remains to be seen.
In any case, the foregoing considerations suggest that there is no one thing which
counts as solving a paradox. We will say that by a pamdox we mean a seemingly valid
argument, with seemingly true (or mutually consistent) premises but a seemingly false (or
contradictory) conclusion. Perhaps standardly one thinks of solving a paradox as finding
the mistake, as providing an answer to the question 'What's wrong with this argument?' ..
The surprise exam paradox may fit this mold, but the other paradoxes so far mentioned do
not. The arguments that constitute the care-taker, Liar and Sorites paradoxes are each so
bare-boned that one "finds" the mistake straight away.
It will not do to revise the standard thought by saying that in order to solve a
paradox one must find the mistake and resolve any puzzles which consequently arise; such a
revision would be too demanding. Above I claimed that it is not difficult to accept that Kate
4In the case of the care-taker. we appealed only to universal instantiation (including UI in the scope
of an existential quantifier); in the case of the Liar, we appealed only to universal instantiation and the
substitutivity of identity.
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either takes care of herself or she doesn't (an equivalent of the negation of the contradictory
'kRk iff -,kRk') because it is not difficult to see how it could be tIle one or the other. But
this downplayed the problem, for it is difficult to accept that it must be one or the other.
The takes care of relation has borderline cases, and for that reason, it seems, it could just
be that neither 'Kate takes care of herself' nor 'Kate does not take care of herself' is correct.
This is a puzzle-a puzzle which, moreover, arises upon reflection of the care-taker paradox.
Yet one need not address this puzzle in order to solve the care-taker. For some reason, it
ju~t seems unrelated.
It will now be tempting to say that in order to solve a paradox, one must find
the mistake and resolve any related puzzles which consequently arise. Even if right, this
would be singularly uninformative: in part because it will not always be clear whether a
given puzzle is related to a given paradox; and in part because it will not always be clear
whether, when a given puzzle arises, it is consequent upon finding the mistake in a given
argument. In any case, I believe this thought is wrong. We have already seen that finding
the mistake in a paradoxical argument is not always sufficient for solving the paradox, as
it is not in the version of the Liar paradox I set out above. Below it will also enlerge that
finding the mistake in a paradoxical argument is not always required for solving it, for there
are formulations of the Sorites paradox in which the mistaken premise cannot be found. I
will not consider any further the univocity of paradox solving, but instead will get down to
business and commence discussion of what I do think solving the Sorites involves.
1.2 Solving the Sorites
I would like to begin with a little compare and contrast.
I. First, it is worth repeating, the Sorites paradox shares a feature with the Liar and
care-taker paradoxes which the surprise exam paradox does not, namely, that the work of
identifying the flaw in its argument comes virtually for free. In light of the Sorites argument
(p. 9 above) It IS clear that the tolerance principle for 'heap' cannot be true. I know that
10,000 grains of sand can form a heap, (and if you are unsure of this, pick any number yOh
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prefer). But this, together with the tolerance principle, and the aid of 9,999 applications of
Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens, licenses the conclusion that one grain of sand
can form a heap.5 The conclusion is not licensed, however, and since MP and UI are surely
valid,6 it must be that the tolerance principle is not true.
II. Restricting our attention now to just the care-taker, Liar and Sorites paradoxes, we
may note a second point of contrast. The abstraction, disquotation and tolerance principles
are each, as I have formulated them, universal generalizations, none of which can be true.
Presumably, then, not every instance of these generalizations is true.7 For the abstraction
and disquotation principles, we have already got our hands on an untrue il1stance; for the
tolerance principle, we do not.
But could we find an untrue instance? We would begin by limiting our search.
Start with some obvious facts about heaps of sand: some numbers of grains, for example
one grain, are too few to form a heap; other numbers of grains, perhaps a trillion grains, are
too many to form a heap, but would form instead a mountain; if a number falls into this
latter category, then so will any number greater than it; meanwhile, 10,000 falls into neither
category, since 10,000 grains can form a heap. From these facts it follows that any untrue
instance of the tolerance principle must also be an instance of the bounded generalization
'For any n < 10, 000, if n + 1 grains of sand can form a heap then so can n grains'. We
could no doubt choose a lower bound than this, it doesn't matter. What does matter is that
the existence of a bound is in an important way misleading. It suggests that there is some
specific finite task we could perform, upon completion of which it would be decided whether
an untr~e instance were discoverable by us or not. It suggests, perhaps~ that we need only
assess each of the ten-thousand instances of the bounded generalization, and when at the
5The proof need not be so long, however. As George Boolos (1991) has pointed out, if we help ourselves
to two further inference rules-Universal Generalization and transitivity of the conditional, the length of
the derivation can be reduced to fewer than seventy lines.
6In fact we've only employed a restricted form of Modus Ponens, one whose conditional premise contains
no conditionals as constituents-hence one not prey to McGee's (1985) counterexamples.
7Kamp (1981) actually rejects this. He proposes a semantics for vague predicates according to which
Ja13e universal generalizations may have none but true instances.
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end of this assessment we have not found an untrue instance, it will have been shown that
we are unable to find one. But this is not so. Although there is a bound on the number of
instances we need consider, there is no bound on the number of times or the length of time
we need consider them. Who knows, maybe after the fifth rUD, or after the sixth, we would
hit upon that instance which just struck us, glaringly, as untrue.
If we suppose, however, as it seems reasonable to suppose, that we are in fact
unable to discover an untrue instance, then we have a problem. For then it would be a
simple matter to formulate an intractable version of the Sorites paradox by replacing the
unbounded tolerance principle in the Sorites argument with the finite set of instances of the
bounded universal above,8 yielding:
10,000 grains of sand can form a heap
If 10,000 grains of sand can form a heap then so can 9,999 grains
If 9,999 grains of sand can form a heap then so can 9,998 grains
If 9,998 grains of sand can form a heap then so can 9,997 grains
If 3 grains of sand can form a heap then so can 2 grains
If 2 grains of sand can form a heap then so can 1 grain
Therefore, 1 grain of sand can form a heap
This version of the paradox would be intractable in the sense that we would be unable to
find the mistake-to say which premise was not true. Thus the similarity in the first respect
mentioned, of the Sorites to the Liar and care-taker, is as superficial as its dissimilarity to
them in the second respect is deep.
What is wanted, if the Sorites paradox is intractable, is an explanation of our in-
ability to find an untrue instance of the tolerance principle. This explanation is wanted for
t.wo reasons. On the one hand, such an explanation would provide a justification for philcr
sophical approaches to the Sorites. fur if it were possible for us to discover which instance
is untrue, then the right way to go about it, since none of the instances is contradictory,
would be to head to the beach and start heaping. Without an advance explanation of why
8We will, in so doing, dispense with the need for UI.
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such an experiment would be unsuccessful, we have no excuse for not going out and getting
our hands dirty. The fact that we have not yet found an untrue instance is by itself no
guarantee that we will not in the future.
On the other hand, the explanation is wanted just because our inability to find an
untrue instance is wholly mysterious without an explanatioIl, and should cast doubt on
the idea that we really know what 'heap' means. One would have thought that 'heap' is a
word designed by humans to make classifications for human purposes; that in particular, it
was designed expressly to require only "casual observation" (as Wright put it),9 and never
investigation, for deciding its applicability; and that consequently, for any given n, the
question whether n grains of sand can form a heap could never be a matter of something
hidden from our view. One would have thought, moreover, that knowledge of the meaning of
'heap' reqtlires knowledge that its applicability can be decided by only casual observation-
someone who uses a microscope or other such aid to decide whether a thing is a heap, even
if he always gets it right, cannot be said to know the meaning of the word.1o Assuming,
however, that we can know what 'heap' means, such knowledge cannot require it to be
known that: for any given n, the question whether n grains of sand can form a heap could
never be a matter of something hidden from our view; since if the Sorites is intractable,
as we are supposing, this is not even true. For if we could correctly decide whether any
such 'heap' sentence were true, then we could also correctly decide whether any complex
sentence built up from such 'heap' sentences and logical connectives were true. But this is
just what we are supposing not to be the case. I will consider an explanation of our inability
to find an untrue instance of 'For any n < 10, 000, if n + 1 grains of sand can form a heap
then so can n grains' to be a required component of any solution to the Sorites. I will also
take this to involve explanation of how that inability is compatible with the possibility of
our knowing what 'heap' means.
III. I would like to discuss one final point of comparison. The abstraction and disquotation
9(Wright 1975, p. 335).
lOThis is somewhat of an overstatement. The use of some aids, for example binoculars, may be appropriate
on some occasions, for example when the thing is far away.
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principles enjoy some initial appeal, but in light of the paradoxes it is not difficult to accept
that while they hold good in many instances, the principles do not hold good in general. 11
The appeal of the tolerance principle, in contrast, seems to be unrelenting. The resistance
to giving it up has led some to rather bizarre views, for example:
• The tolerance principle is true; what is not true is that there are heaps! (Unger 1979)
• Well, the tolerance principle is not true, but all of its instances are! (Kamp 1981)
• The tolerance principle is true, and the Sorites paradox is a "genuine" paradox (Dum-
mett 1975)-by which it is difficult to understand Dummett as meaning anything other
thall a valid argument with true premises and a false conclusion! .
Why is the appeal of the tolerance principle so great? Why does the idea that
minute changes in size cannot affect the applicability of 'heap' have such a grip on us? I
will consider the provision of an answer to this question to be the second required component
of any solution to the Sorites. The hope is that we would be able to rid ourselves of the
compulsion to believe tolerance principles, if we could identify the source of our attraction
to them.
That ends the comparison. We are not yet finished, though, with our discussion of what
is involved in solving the Sorites. A final question to be contended with is, what are we
to say of the denial of the tolerL'.nce principle? If the Sorites paradox leads us to give up
the tolerance principle, then it should also command our acceptance of its negation. The
reason for this is not that our beliefs must be negation complete-it is not that for every
claim, we must believe either it or its negation. Nor is it that in every case where we have
reason to give up a belief we once held, we thereby acquire reason to believe the contrary.
(We may have reason to give up a belief we once held when we discover, for example, that
liTo find trouble-makers for the disquotation principle, one needn't turn to such exotic sentences as the
Liar. 'I am hungry' (uttered now by you) may be true even though I am not hungry. Additionally, as Kripke
(1975) has emphasized, whether a sentence is Liar-like or not may depend not just on its form, but also
on the facts: Whether 'Everything Nixon said was true' is Liar-like or not depends on what Nixon said.
(Suppose Nixon said he once lied.)
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our grounds for it were not good grounds.) We are led to give up the tolerance principle,
though, because it proves incompatible with plain truths: that 10,000 grains of sand can
form a heap and that one grain cannot. It is for that reason that we should not only give
up the tolerance principle but also outright deny it.
The denial of the tolerance principle, however, is apparently equivalent to the claim
that the predicate 'heap' has, as we shall say, sharp boundaries-that there is a number n
such that (n + 1) grains of sand can form a heap but n grains cannot, which on the face
of it seems absurd. How could there be a heap that one could turn into a non-heap just
by removing a tiny little grain of sand from it? How could the boundary between being a
heap and not being a heap be so precise, so sharp?
Suppose you have a heap of sand and remove the grains from it gingerly one by
one. Call the result of each removal a stage. We are supposed to accept that at some stage
we will have a heap, while at the next stage we will not. There are at least two separate
reasons we find it difficult to accept the existence of such a stage. I think it important
to distinguish them. One reason for the difficulty is that it seems that before getting to
a non-heap stage, we will pass through some stages where it is indetenninate whether the
thing before us is a heap, where there is "no fact of the matter" as to whether the thing
before us is a heap, where what we have before us is a borderline case. A second reason for
the difficulty, not surprisingly, is just our original affinity for tolerance--our belief that if
you have a heap at any stage, you will have a heap at the next stage too, not a borderline
case, but a heap. If we line up the stages in order, then the first thought is that betuleen the
heaps and the non-heaps will be some things of indeterminate status; the second thought is
that any pair of adjacent st3ges must have the same status, whether it be heap, non-heap
or indetenninate. These two thoughts conspire to make the sharp-boundaries claim doubly
difficult to accept.
Consider an analogy. Suppose someone walks into a third-grade classroom, lines up
all the people in it, then tells you that somewhere in the line a girl is standing next to a
boy. (We assume there are both boys and girls in the classroom.) You would find it difficult
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to accept this claim if you believed, by analogy with the first thought, that the teacher was
standing between the girls and the boys. By analogy with the second thought, you would
find it difficult to accept the claim if you believed that anyone standing next to a girl was
a girl.
The analogy makes it clear, if it was not clear already, that the second thought
cannot be maintained. Given any finite series, and any killds of status, if any two members
of the series do not have the same status, then it cannot be that adjacent members always
do have the same status.
There is nothing so patently problematic with the first thought, however-witll the
thought that it can sometimes be indeterminate whether a thing is a heap, and that as you
remove the grains one by one from a heap you will get to such things before you get to the
things that are not heaps. A pressing question is whether, despite the Sorites paradox, this
thought can be maintained. On some accounts we are not required, despite the paradox,
to accept the clairn that for some n, (n + 1) grains can form a heap while n grains cannot,
because 'heap' has borderline cases-the existence of borderline cases renders the sharp
boundaries claim untrue. On other accounts we are required to accept the claim, but in one
way or another it is argued that this is compatible with the predicate's having borderline
cases.
There is still another pressing question, less frequently addressed by those who now
write about the paradox: the question whether some revised version of the second thought
can be maintained. It cannot be that heap stages in our series are always directly followed
by heap stages. But could there be some kernel of truth in the idea? Some acceptable
alternative to it which can be recovered? It would be easier to give up the second thought
if we could defend an affirmative answer to this question. A revision of the the second
thought might take the form of a qualification: All adjacent pairs of stages in our series
that meet condition C always have the same status. Another ca.ndidate form for the revision
is: Every stage bears some special relation R to adjacent stages, which it does not bear to
more distant stages--where R should be in some way like, though not identical to, 'has the
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same status as'. There is no guarantee that a tenable such revision is to be found, but any
complete solution to the Sorites should involve a search for one.

Chapter 2
Com.peting Accounts of Vagueness
In this chapter, I present some going solutions to the Sorites. Before proceeding, however,
v_"e should review the list of qU(:stiODB which I claim should be addressed by any complete
solution to the Sorites.
1. If the tolerance principle is not true, why are we unable to say which instance or
instances of it are not true?
2. Why are we so attracted by the tolerance principle in the first place?
3. Can we, despite the paradox, maintain the thought that 'heap' has borderline cases,
even though that thought seems to conflict with the denial of the tolerance principle?
4. Can we, despite the paradox, maintain in some revised form the thought that adja-
cent stages in our series always have the same status?
The accounts to be presented in this chapter share a common feature. Each of
them proposes an affirmative answer to'question 3. above. That is, each of them upholds,
in one way or another, the claim that 'heap' has borderline cases. What the different
accounts provide are different ways of understanding the claim that do not lead us back
into the paradox. The claim is always assumed to be defensible, since it is assumed that
to deny that 'heap' has borderline cases would just be to deny that it is vague. Russell
(1923, p. 148) said that the word 'red' is vague since "there are shades of colour concerning
which we shall be in doubt whether to call them red or not, not becaUBe we are ignorant
of the meaning of the word 'red', but because it is a word the extent of whose application
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is essentially doubtful." Borderline cases Ilave been taken to be the defining marlc of a
predicate's vagueness ever since.
After noting the "essential doubtfulness" of certain predications of 'red', Russell
immediately went on to say:
This, of course, is the answer to the old puzzle about the man who went bald.
It is supposed that at first he was not bald, that he lost his hairs one by one,
and that in the end he was bald; therefore, it is argued, there must have been
one hair the loss of which converted him into a bald man. This, of course, is
absurd.
No contemporary philosopher follow~Russell in taking the paradox to be so easily dispensed
with-to be resolved just by noting that predicates subject to the paradox have borderline
cases. Nevertheless, nC'ne of the accounts to be considered does provide a complete solution
to the Sorites in my estimation, since none of them addresses all of questions 1-4. Moreover,
as we shall see, they do not even address the same subset of them.
2.1 Truth-Value Gaps and Degrees of Truth
What do we mean when we say that an object is a borderline case of a predicate? To pick
a concrete example, consider the cover of Dummett's The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.
(We'll call it LBM.) It seems to be a borderline case of 'red'. What does this mean? I
take it that the phrase 'borderline case' is not in need of definition, since I take it that the
the phrase is in common usage. We are not using it as a technical term. The phrase is in
need of some analysis, however. As Russell put it, if LBM is a borderline case of red, it is
because it is "essentially doubtful" whether the applicability of 'red' extends to it. His use
of epistemological vocabulary is somewhat misleading. Russell wanted to convey that there
is more to LBM's being a borderline case for 'red' than its being unknowable whether it is
red. He wanted to convey that here there is no fact to be known. He might have argued as
follows: the meaning of 'red' is such that anyone who knows it can tell by looking, if a thing
is red, that it is red (assuming visual faculties, lighting conditions, etc. to be favorable); or
if it is not red, that it is not red. If when looking at LBM we who know what 'red' means
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cannot tell whether it is red, then it cannot be a fact that LBM is red, and it cannot be
a fact that LBM is not red; were either a fact, we would be ~ble to tell. Neither 'LBM is
red' nor'LBM is not red' is true. So taking the falsity of p to be the truth of its negation,
neither sentence is either true or false.
The argument is not confined to observational predicates-predicates whose appli-
cability to a thing depends only on the thing's appearance. Whether 'old' applies to a
thing has nothing to do with its appearance, but the argument may be extended to 'old' as
follows: the meaning of 'old' is such that anyone who knows it can tell whether a man is
old just by learning his age. If you who know what 'old' means cannot tell whether a man
is old, even though you know his age, then it cannot be a fact that he is old, nor a fact
that he is not old. Were either a fact, you would be able to telL The argument is rather
simplified, since to know whether a thing is old, one has to know not only its age but also
general facts about the typical life-span and stages of development of things of its kind, and
perhaps other things as well. But the crux of the argument is that once one is in possession
of certain sorts of information, one will be in a position to tell whether a thing is old, in the
sense that rational reflection on one's information will be sufficient for correctly deciding the
question, given knowledge of what 'old' means. Once one is informed, for example, about
the degrees of the angles of a four-sided figure, one will be in a position to tell whether the
figure is square. Given what is meant by 'in a position to tell', the following is a tautology:
if I am in a position to tell whether a thing is old, but still no amount of reflection would
enable me to decide that it is old or to decide that it is not old, then it cannot be true that
the thing is old, and it cannot be true that the thing is not old. Thus the argument may be
extended to any predicate F, as long as one can be in a position to tell whether F applies
to some thing, without being able to decide that F does or that it doesn't apply to that
thing.
What we now want to know is, how harmless was our simplification? If being
informed about a thing's age does not place one in a position to tell whether it is old, (just
as being informed about a man's income, for example, does not really place one in a position
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to tell whether that man is rich--maybe he's paying off huge debts), exactly what other
sorts of information are required? Can we be sure that it is indeed possible for someone
to be in a position to tell whether a thing is old without being able to decide that it is or
that it isn't, when we have not yet specified what sorts of information do place one in a
position to tell whether a thing is old? It \vill not do to say that even in absence of such
a specification we can be assured of the envisaged possibility, since in some cases we find
ourselves unable to decide whether a thing is old, and no amount of new information would
help us to decide. It will not do to say this, unless one can argue against the possibility that
in such a situation we are faced with an unknowable truth. The challenge, to my knowledge,
has not been met. 1
Nevertheless, there has been fairly wide-spread consensus among those who write
about vagueness that the attribution of a predicate to its borderline cases does lead t? truth-
value gaps-by which I just mean sentences that are neither true nor false. Proponents of
this view must say whether such sentences are to be deemed as having some value other
than true or false; if so, whether there is more than one such value; and in addition, what
is the value of a complex sentence containing a gappy sentence as a constituent.
A basic approach would be to say that there is exactly one more value, Indefinite,
and that the value of a complex sentence is given by filling in each of the blanks newly
added to the classical two-valued truth tables with one of True, False or Indefinite:
p -'p & T I F V T I F ---+ T I F
T F T T F T T T T T F
I I I I
F T F F F F T F F T T
Clearly, there are many ways the tables could be filled in, and some ways are more
interesting than others.2 Commutativity and associativity, for example, are desirable prop-
erties for both conjunction and disjunction, but there are ways of filling in the tables that
IFor a pessimistic view, see Williamson (1996).
2For a useful survey of many alternatives that have been adopted, see Bole & B~rowik (1992, ch. 3).
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do not respect these properties.3 If the properties are respected, then the basic n.pproach
could be extended to a first-order language by l~tting the value of a universally (existen-
tially) quantified sentence be equivalent to the value of the conjunction (disjunction) of its
instances.
Although there are many ways the tables could be filled in, we may broadly distin-
guish those which let indefiniteness trump, as in the first group of tables below, from those
which let truth or falsity trump where appropriate, of which the second group of tables4
provides a representative example.
I. p
T
I
F
F
I
T
&
T
I
F
T I F
T I F
I I I
F I F
V T I F
TTl T
I I I I
F T I F
.;. T
T T
I I
F T
I F
I F
I I
I T
II. p
T
I
F
F
I
T
&
T
I
F
T
T
I
F
I
I
I
F
F
F
F
F
V T
T T
I T
F T
I F
T T
I I
I F
--+
T
I
F
T
T
T
T
I F
I F
I I
T T
The first group of tables seems appropriate when indefiniteness is understood as
the value assigned to a sentence that does not express a proposition, because it contains a
nonsense word, say, or a Don-referring term. If a sentence is def~tive in one of these ways,
it will infect any sentence containing it as a part. 'Grass is green or Hook is blandy' is no
more meaningful than 'Hook is blandy' on its own.
The second group of tables seems more appropriate when dealing with the sort of
indetermillacy thought to arise from vagueness, however. If Kate is kind, then 'Kate is
kind or Kate is funny' should be true even if she is only borderline funny. The truth of the
first disjunct i,B sufficient for the truth of the whole. There seems no reason to relegate the
disjunction to indefiniteness.
3 An operator * is commutative if the value of A • B is always equal to that of B • Ai it is associative if
the value of (A • B) • C is always equal to that of A • (B. C).
4Due to Kleene (1952).
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However the tables are filled in, what is distinctiv~ about this basic approach is
that it admits exactly one value in addition to tn.ce and false, and that it treats the logical
connectives (and in an extended sense also the quantifiers) as truth-functional.5 Both of
these features may be questioned.
One popular account retains the second feature while jettisoning the first by ad-
witting not just three values, but a continuum of values-represented by the real numbers
from 0 to 1.6 How are we to understand these different values? Goguen (1967) gives some
indic&tion:
... S(x) is the truth of the statement 'x is short'. So S(x) = 1 means 'x is
short' and Sex) = 0 means 'x is not (at all) short', while Sex) = ~ means 'x is
half-short' or ' "x is short" is half-true'.
If we take a series of men ranging from five-feet to six-feet tall, each Ulan one
millimeter shorter than his successor in the series, then the idea is that as we move along
the s~~ries, at some point the value of 'x is short' will begin to gradually decrease-it will
get less and les~ true. The value of 'x is short' will be 1 when the first man in the series is
assigned to x and 0 when tile last man is. The drop in value witnessed in one move from
any man to the next will be at most some very small number E. (In this case c might equal
l~O.) Before we can assess how well this account provides resolutioll of the Sorites paradox,
we must fill in some more details.
On this account, the logical connectives will be degree-functional. The vaille of a
disjunction p V q, for example, will be a function just of the values of p and q, no matter
which sentences p and q might be. What we want to know is, which function. As in the
three-value case, there are again many choices, bllt there are also plausible constraints. One
important constraint is that the functions should extend the classical two-valued truth tables
5To say that conjunction, for example, is truth-functional is to say that if sentences A and A' have the
same value and B and B' have the same value, then the conjunction of A and B has the same value as the
conjunction of A' and B', whatever A, B~ A' and B' may be.
6The account to be presented is derived primarily from Lukasiewicz & Tarski (1930), Goguen (1967),
Lakoff (1973), and Machina (1976). Unlike Goguen, Lakoff and Machina, Lukasiewicz did not consider how
infinite-valued logic might be applied to the problem of vagueness. He also did not takr the values to be the
real numbers, but rather the rational numbers between 0 and 1.
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in the sense that when restricted to the classical values "complete truth" (1) and "complete
falsity" (0) they should yield classical results. Again, commutativity and associativity of
conjunction and disjunction are also desirable. Tllese constraints do not completely restrict
our choice, but further considerations may be brought to bear.7 We will not go into detail
about what these considerations might be, but just present those clauses which are often
considered to be the most plausible starting point.
[..,p) - 1 - (P]
(p & q] = min{(p], [q]}
(p V q] _. max{(p] , [q]}
(p ~ q] - min{l,l - ((P] - [q])}
[\fxFx] - min{[Fx]: x is assigned an object in the domain}
[3xFx] = max{[Fx]: x is assigned an object in the domain}
Square brackets are used here to denote the value of a sentence: [P] is the value of p. The
functions min and max select the least (:5) and greatest (~) number, respectively, from
a set of numbers.8 Thus the disjunction of two sentences will have the value of its truest
disjunct, while the conjunction of two sentences will have the value of its least true conjunct.
Similarly, an existentially quantified sentence will have the value of its truest instance,9 while
a universally quantified sentence will have the value of its least true inf3tance. A conditional
will be completely true if its consequent is at least as true as its antecedent; oth€rwjse the
value of the conditional will be 1 less the difference between the vahJes of the consequent
and antecedent. Thus if (P] = .6 and [q] = .7, then (p --+ q] = 1 and [q --+ p] = .9.10 Some
classical equalities are retained, for exa.mple De Morgan's laws, the distributive laws for
conjunction and disjunction, double negation elimination, contraposition, and quantifier
conversion. Other classical equalities no longer hold, for example:
7Williamson (1994, §4.8) presents plausible constraints which do uniquely determine what funct,ions
conjunction and disjunction may be.
SIn case there is no least or greatest number, min and max select the greatest lower bound and least
upper bound, respectively, from a set of numbers. Here the choice of reals as values rather than rationals
becomes important, since min and max are totally defined on sets of the former but not of the latter.
9Or the least upper bound of the values of its iIL.CJtances.
101£ the biconditional is defined as the conjunction of a conditional and its converse, then the value of a
biconditional A H B equals 1 if [AJ = [B); otherwise 1 minus the absolute value of [A] - fB).
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[p -7 q] = (-,(P & -,q)]
[p~q] - [-,pVq]
Let's now see how the degrees-oI-truth account is able to handle the Sorites paradox:
Heap (10,000)
\In (Heap (n + 1) -+ Heap (n))
Therefore, Heap (1)
The first premise is deemed to be completely true, that is, its value is 1. The conclusion is
deemed to be completely false, its value o. Meanwhile, for some n, the value of 'Heap (n)'
will be neither 0 nor 1, but somewhere in between. Nevertheless, for each n, the value of
'Heap (n)' will be at most (say) .001 less than the value of 'Heap (n + 1)'. Hence the value
of each instance of the second premise, by our clause for '-+:, is at least .999; so the value
of the second premise (the tolerance principle) is itself at least .999, by our clause for 'Vx'.
Is the argument valid on this account? The question remains open. When values
other than truth and falsity are introduced, we must ask which are the values that a rule
of inference must preserve in order to be deemed valid. We call such values designated
values. Assuming that a value greater than a designated value is itself a designated value,
Universal Instantiation will be valid on this account no matter which set of values are chosen
as designated. The choice of designated values does, however, affect the validity of Modus
Ponens. If 1 is the only designated value,11 then Modus Ponens is valid: for if [p --+ q] = 1,
______t_he_D-----<(q] is at least as great as fp]; so if fp] = 1 then ~q] = 1 too. If vahles less th.-.MJanL&...........&.l a~I·....s...<.e _
also designated, however, Modus Ponens is not valid. For suppose the set of designated
values is {x : x ~ .9}. Then if [P] = .9 and [q] = .8, the values of p and p --+ q are both
designated---each is equal to .9-but the value of q is not designated. 12 Either way, the
11 The is the approach adopted by Lukasiewicz.
12This seems to be the approach favored by Goguen. Some alternative approaches require no choice of
designated 'Values. That favored by Lakoff is: a rule of inference ~ is valid just in case the value of A ;5 never
lower than the value of any member of r I even when the values of the members of r are themselves very low.
Modus Ponens is not validated on this account. The approach favored by Edgington (1992), who rejects
degree-functionality, is: a rule of inferenCE ~ is valid just in case 1 - [AJ is never greater than E 1 - [5].
SEr
Modus Ponens is validated on this account.
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verdict is (as it should be) that the Sorites argument is not a good argument: if its premises
are acceptable then its reasoning is not; conversely, if its reasoning is acceptable, thell its
premises are not.
What answers, if any, does the degrees of truth account provide to questions 1-4 above
(p. 23)1 The answer to question 2. is that we are attracted to tolerance principles because
they enjoy a very high degree of truth. If the difference in value between 'Heap (i + 1)' and
'Heap (i)' never exceeds E, then the value of the tolerance principle for 'heap' will be at
least 1 - E. Since e will be very small, 1 - E will be correspondingly high.
The answer to 3. is: yes we can maintain the thought that 'heap' has borderline
cases and, despite the paradox, we are not required to accept the sharp-boundaries claim-
that for some n, Heap (n + 1) and -,Heap (n). There are borderline cases in the sense that
for some n, 'Heap (n)' is neither completely true nor completely faIse, but has instead a
value in the intermediary range. In order for the sharp boundaries claim to be completely
true, and hence command our acceptance, there would have to be an n such that the value
of 'Heap (n + 1)' equaled 1 while that of 'Heap (n)' equaled o. There is no such n since the
borderline cases are nestled between those n for which 'Heap (n)' is completely true and
those for which it is completely false. Since the sharp boundaries claim is not completely
true, we are not required to accept it.
The answer to 4. is yes, we have revealed a revised version of the untenable thought
that adjacent stages always have the same status. The revision takes the form: every stage
does bear a special relation R to adjacent stages, which it does not bear to more distant
stages. That relation R is not has the same status as but rather, has a status extremely
similar to.
.But what of our first question: If the tolerance principle is not true, why are we
unable to find an untrue instance of it? To this the degree-theorist replies, "We are, as it
turns out, able to find an untrue instance of the tolerance principle. Pick some n for which
'Heap (n+l)' and 'Heap (n)' both obviously have middling values. 'Heap (n+l)' will be truer
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than 'Heap (n)', so 'Heap (n + 1) ~ Heap (n)' will not be (completely) true." The answer
is unsatisfactory-it misses the point of our original question. The degree-theorist is able to
answer our original question while begging it, since on his account, untrue conditionals need
not have true antecedents. So let us rephrase the question. If the tolerance principle is not
true, and has only finitely many Ilntrue instances, why can we not identify all of its untrue
instances? More to the point: if some instance of the tolerance principle has a completely
true antecedent but not a completely true consequent, why can we not say which instance
that is? As so far presented, the degree theory has no means of answering this question.
In effect what we are now asking the degree-theorist is, why can we not locate
the point of transition from complete heaphood to borderline heaphood in our series of
stages. Given all we've said so far, tile degree theorist seems committed to the existence
of such a point, and cannot explain why we cannot find it. Tile commitment sterns from
an assumption that the meta-language in which the degree-theoretic semantics for a vague
language is formulated is not itself vague: that in particular, sentences of the form irA] = x'
are themselves either completely true or completely false. But perhaps the degree-theorist
could give up the assumption, and thereby discharge the commitment to the precise point.
The story would run something like this: "In order for us to be able to locate a
point of transition in our series from complete heaphood to borderline heaphood, there
would have to be an n such that the value of '['Heap(n + 1)'] = l' equaled 1, while the
value of '['Heap(n)'] < l' also equaled 1. But there is no such n. The truth of statements
in our meta-language is not an all or nothing matter, it also comes in degrees." Rather
thall gauge the merit of this reply, I want to step back and make some general comments
about the move that has been made here-the introduction of higher-order vagueness as
an explanation of our inability to find a sharp boundary between those things that are not
borderline case and those things that are are.
What is higher-order vagueness? There has been in recent discussions some equivocation
on this point. I have said that a predicate is commonly defined to be vague just in case
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it has borderline cases. Let us now call this first-order vagueness. On one conception of
higher-order vagueness, a predicate is higher-order vague just in case certain higher-order
predicates are first-order vague.13 These higher-order predicates may either be {.-tedicates
in the meta-language such as 'has the value .5', or they may be complex predicates in the
object language containing operators such as 'half', as in 'is half-short'. (Recall that Goguen
regarded 'x is half-short' and ' "z is short" is half-true' as equivalent.) Thus 'short' is first-
order vague if it has borderline cases; second-order vague if 'half-short' (or 'completely-short'
or 'three-eighths-short' or the like) has borderline cases-or equivalently, if for some name
r ,
a, Q is short is a borderline case of 'has the value .5' (or 'has the value I', etc.); 'short'
is third-order vague if 'half-short' or the like is second-order vague; (n + l)th-order vague if
'half-short' or the like is nth-order vague. 14
It should be mentioned that the definition of higher-order vagueness can be expressed
in a way that is more neutral with respect to competing accounts of vagueness. Instead. of
employing the operators 'complete(ly)' and 'half' in 011r definition of higher-order vagueness,
we may use the operators 'definitely' and 'borderline' with the specific intent that these
r ,
words be neutral. Taking 'borderline' as primitive, is definitely F may be defined by
r ,
is F and not borderline F . Sense may be given to these operators as is appropriate for a
particular view.
The second conception of higher-order vagueness is much more inchoate than the
first. If when a predicate F is first-order vague, we are unable to locate the boundary
between the F's and the non-F's, then if we are also unable to locate the boundary between
the things that are definitely F and those that are borderline F, it must be because F is
second-order vague. Thus second-order vagueness is conceived to be whatever it is that is
the source of this inability. Third-order vagueness will be whatever it is that is the source
of an inability to locate a second-order boundary) and so OD.
13 CI. Williamson (1994, p. 157), Fine (1975, p. 287)
14To give a rigorous account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for (n + l)th.order vagueness, we
would have to specify just what is meant by "'half-short' or the like." This is not a trivial problem, and I
have not yet reached a conclusion about what exactly the specification should be.
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The two conceptions are tacitly assumed to amount to the same thing. It is thought
that we are unable to locate the boundary between (for example) the men who are short
and the men who are not short because there are borderline cases between the men who fall
definitely into one or the other category-it is the existence of borderline cases that explains
our inability. The subsequent assumption is that there mllSt be a parallel explanation of our
inability to locate the boundary between the men who are definitely short and those who
are borderline cases. The parallel explanation is provided by acceptance of a class of mel}
who do not fall definitely into one of these categories-a second-level class of borderline
cases.
In my view, the picture is off the mark. What is mistaken about it is its initial
suggestion that the existence of borderline cases is what explains our inability to locate
the first-order boundary. In my view, the existence of borderline cases is not really what
explains our inability to locate boundaries at all. We mlL~t postpone elaboration of the view,
however. We will also leave afffor the moment our discussion of higher-order vagueness, with
the conclusion that it is probably best ullderstood in accordance with the first conception
above, namely, as the vagueness of certain higher-order predicates. It then remains an
open question whether there is higher-order vagueness, and whether something other than
higher-order vagueness might explain our inability to locate "higher-order" boundaries.
We now resume discussion of the degree-theoretic resolution of the Sorites paradox. We had
wondered whether the degree-theorist could provide an answer to our first question: Why
can we not discover an instance of the tolerance principle that has a completely true an-
tecedent but not a completely true consequent? The degree-theorist may have the resources
to provide an answer to this question by extending his semantics to the language in which
that semantics was formulated. But short of doing that, it seems he must remain silent.
I will not explore the prospects for a degree-theoretic account of higher-order vagueness,15
15Though for a dim view of the prospects, see Fine (1975, pp. 292£.), Rolf (1984, pp. 222£.), Burns (1991,
pp. 72-74), and Williamson (1994, §4.12).
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for I think we must first assess whether the answers already provided by the account are
adequate.
What has made the degree-theoretic account of vagueness seem so plausible to many
is that it provides answers to questions 2. and 4. when other accounts do not. The degree-
theorist is able to help us rest more easily with the fact that we must give up the tolerance
principle since on the one hand he provides an explanation of why we were so drawn to it
in the first place (question 2.), and on the other hand he provides a revision of it that is
acceptable (question 4.). The account is only 88 good as its underpinnings~ however. We
still do not know what degrees of truth are, and so we have no idea what the connection
might be between the degree of truth of a sentence and its attractiveness to us. Thus we
still have no re880D to accept that high-degrees of truth do explain our attraction to certain
sentences.
The most common criticism of the approach is that it assigns values to some sen-
tences that are intuitively too high. Although instances of excluded middle are not always
assigned the value 1,16 (and this has in many quarters been deemed to be a good thillg),
the flip side is that instances of contradictions will not always be assigned the value o.
For example, [p & ...,p] = ! when [PJ = ~. Attempts have been made to lower the value
of contradictions by revising the clause for ' & '. 17 But no degree-functional account can
reduce the values of contradictions to 0 without losing all credibility. For if the value of
a conjunction is just a function of the value of its conjuncts, and in particular is blind to
any logical relations these conjuncts might bear to each other, then were [-,p] to equal [...,q],
[p & -,p] would equal [p & rq). This can be seen to be implausible when we let [P] = !' for
then [...,p] = [...,...,p], and so [p & .,...,p] would be o.
How good is the objection? I say that at this point, we have no more reason to thin,k
the objection good than we have reason to accept that possession of a high degree of truth
explains our attraction to the tolerance principle. Until we have an explanation of what of
16For example, when (P] = ~, [p V -,p] = max{~, (1 - ~)} = !.
17Goguen (1967) for example at one point suggests that we might let [p & q) =[PI x [q).
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it is to have the value !' we have no grounds for regarding that value as too high for a con-
tradiction to have. After all, when faced with borderline cases we are sometimes attracted
to contradictions, at least in the sense that it may seem appropriate to utter them. Were
I to be asked whether LBM is red, I might well reply (though in a hesitant, not assertive
tone of voice), "Well, ... it's red and it isn't." If degrees of truth are supposed to explain
our attraction to certain sentences, and we are sometimes half-attracted to contradictions,
then ~ might be just the right value for contradictions in some cases.
Tile proponent of the degree-theory may not, however, understand degrees of truth
as just being measures of how attracted we are to a sentence, since that would deprive
the account of any explanatory power. For then to say that we are attracted to tolerance
principles because they enjoy a high degree of truth, would just be to say that we are
attracted to them because we are attracted to them.
The problem is compounded by the fact that the degree of truth assigned to a sen-
tence does not always coincide with the degree of its attractiveness. Moreover, the relative
degrees of truth of two sentences may not always COiIlcide with their relative attractiveness.
Let's look at an example. At some point, the successive values of 'Heap (i)' will cross the
half-way mark. By this I mean that ['Heap(i)'] will be greater than or equal to ~, and
['Heap(i - 1)'] will be less than!. At this point, the value of 'Heap(i) & .Heap(i - 1)'
will itself be at least ~, and may even exceed ~ by a small margin. I8 Consider a concrete
example. Let ['Heap(i)'] = .51 and ['Heap(i - 1)'] = .49; then ['Heap(i) & .Heap(i - 1)'] =
min{ .51, (1 - .49)} = .51.19 Thus, at the point p at which the half-way mark is crossed,
the claim that p is the boundary between the heaps and the non-heaps will have a value at
least as high, possibly higher, than the claim that p is not the boundary. This is contrary
to the relative attractiveness of the two claims.
It would be misguided, at this point, to pursue a strategy of trying to revise the
18NB: It follows that the sharp boundaries claim itself may have a value exceeding ~. C/. Wright (1987,
p. 251) for a similar point.
19More generally, if ['Heap(i)'] = ~ + 6 and ['Heap(i - 1)'] = (~ + 6) - E, where 0 ~ 6 < e, then
['Heap(i) & .Heap(i - 1)'] = ~ + 'min{6, E - 6}.
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clauses for the various logical connectives-in this case conjunction-with the hope of
better approximating degrees of attractiveness with degrees of truth. As long as degree-
functionality is retained, the strategy will never be successful, since the degree of attrac-
tiveness of a complex sentence is not a function of just the degrees of attractiveness of its
parts, but will be a function also of the logical, analytical and also evidentiary relations
those parts bear to one another.20
The degree theorist is thus faced with the task of elaborating a conception of degrees
of truth that meets the following criteria: (i) Degrees of truth do not always coincide with,
but may nonetheless sometimes explain, our attraction to certain sentences; (ii) It is possible
for a contradiction to have a value greater than 0; and (iii) Degrees of truth greater than 0
but less than 1 are properly understood 88 neither true nor false.
One way to understand the degree of truth of a sentence is as a measure of how
similar the world actually is to the way that a sentence says the world is; or conversely, as
a measure of how different things would have to be in order for the sentence to be true. To
illustrate: If there are exactly 250,126,435 permanent residents of the United States, then
'There are 250 million permanent residents of the U.8.' would be very nearly true, Rince
things would not have to be that different in order for it to be true; while 'There are three
permanent residents of the U.8.. ' would be very far from true, since things would have to
be very different from how they in fact are in order for the sentence to be true. A sentence
that is very nearly, but not quite true, may be "true enough" for it to be appropriate to
assert it.
It may be that such a conception of a degree of truth meets criterion (i) above,
for it may be that sometimes we believe a sentence that is only very nearly true because
we do not recognize that things would have to be just slightly different in order for it to
be true. We could then also understand why high (or low) degrees of truth do not always
coincide with our attraction (or aversion) to a sentence. Nevertheless, the account fails to
20An example of what I mean by an evidentiary relation is the relation that a sentence S bears ~o S' when
one could not have evidence for S without also having some evidence for S'.
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meet criteria (ii) and (iii). It fails to meet criterion (ii) since on the present conception of
a degree of truth, the value 0 should be reserved for all and only contradictions, generously
understood. For it makes no sense to say that the world would have to be more different in
order for 'One grain of sand can form a heap' to be true, than it would have to be in order
for a sentence of the form fop & ~p' to be true. No amount of change in the way things
are would be enough to verify a sentence of the form 'p & ...,p'.21 The conception fails to
meet criterion (iii) since although it does give us reason for thinking of being nearly, but
not quite true as a way of being not true, the conception gives us no reason for thinking
of it as a way of being not false. 'There are 250 million residents of tile U.8.' may be very
nearly true, but it is not thereby far from being false; it is not completely false, in the sense
of being widely off the mark, but it is still false. 22
Mark Sainsbury (1988, §2.3) advocates a different way of understanding degrees of
truth-in terms of degrees of confidence. I am more confident that it is raining now, than
I am confident that it was raining yesterday morning; but still more confident that it was
raining yesterday morning than I am confident that it was raining a week ago. It thus makes
sense to think of our confidence in the truth of a statement as COIning in degrees. Sainsbury
believes that our confidence in the truth of statements containing vague predicates may
also come in degrees, but that what is distinctive about the degree of confidence we have
in the truth of these statements is that it may not change as we become better informed.
He believes that I could know all there is to know, and still have only partial confidence in
the truth of 'LBM is red'; "an omniscient being could do no better.... Where we have
vagueness, there may be no chance of improvement" (pp. 44-5). Thus a degree of truth of
a sentence S is conceived to be the degree of confidence in S a fully informed person would
have (or perhaps ought to have) on reflection.
21 A qualification: a change in the meaning of ' & ' might be sufficient to verify a sentence of the form
'p & -,p'; what is meant here is that no amount of change in the way things are would be enough to verify
a sentence of the form 'p & -'p'. given its actual truth-conditions. CI. Kripke (1972).
22It may be that on some occasions, 'there are' may be used with the same sense as 'there are roughly',
and that on such occasions.. 'There are 250 million residents of the U.S.' will be not merely nearly true. but
completely true.
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I find it difficult to accept the compatibility of omniscience and partial degrees of
confidence. On the one hand it seems that partial confidence in the truth of Borne statement
is an attitude someone has only when he believes there to be a correct answer to the question
'is this true?', but is not entirely convinced that he has gotten the answer right. If there is
no correct answer, then a fully informed person will know 88 much, and hence will himself
feel no confidence, not even partial confidence, in any answer. In fact, he will feel completely
confident that his attitude is the right one to take.
But, even if we could make out a conceptiol~ of partial confidence which sensibly
cohered with omniscience, it still remains problematic that partial confidence must fur-
thermore be construed 88 coming in varying degrees. To justify the claim that it does,
Sainsbury (1988, p. 44) invites us to imagine the following scenario: you wish to poison
Jones by mushroom, and you know that all and only red mushrooms are poisonous. It
is then claimed that even if the only mushrooms you can get your hands on are neither
definitely red nor definitely not red, you may still regard it 88 more reasonable to use this
mushroom rather than that one for the job at hand. "The more confident you are that
this mushroom is really red, the more reasonable it is to use it; the less confident, the less
reasonable." This is extremely puzzling. If it is true that all and only red mushrooms are
poisonous, then presumably the vagueness of 'poisonous' must match that of 'red'. If you
are merely partially confident in each of two mushrooms that they will do the job, (and we
are permitted to assume that you are fully informed, even omniscient), what room is there
for being rnore confident in the one mushroom than in the other. It cannot be that you
think it more likely that the one will do the job than that the other will. By hypothesis,
you are correct to lack full confidence in tIle truth of either 'this one will do the job' or 'that
one will', and you know this. You entertain no hope for the truth of either.
Even if sense can be made of the compatibility of omniscience with partial degrees
of truth, the account faces the further problem that even when we are fully informed (in
whatever the appropriate sense turns out to be), our degree of confidence in the truth of
some statement just will not be a function of the degree of our confidence in the truth of its
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paJ:ts. I may be partially confident that a mushroom is red, and still slightly more confident
that it is brown, but I had better be fully confident that it is not both red and brown. It
is surprising in fact that given Sainsbury's interpretation of degrees of truth as degrees of
confidence, he should affirm a degree-functional approach. He writes:
... the naturalness of 'It is and it isn't', as a response to the question whether
a borderline case mushroom is red, gives at least a preliminary indication that
the degree theorist is right to recognize that not all instances of 'p and not-p'
are completely false. (45)
But it seems to me that 'It is and it isn't' (said hesitantly) as a response is not really evidence
of partial confidence in the truth of 'It is and it isn't'. Rather 'It is and it isn't' seems to be
a way of expressing that 'red' has different uses, and that while it could be appropriate or
permissible to call the mushroom 'red' it could also be appropriate or permissible to call it
'not red'. The response is uttered hesitantly not to indicate partial confidence, but rather
to indicate that it is Dot to be construed literally as an assertion.
The final conception of a degree of truth that we will consider is the one most
commonly affirmed, but which in my mind fares even worse than the preceding two. The
idea is to understand the truth of certain comparative claims as providing the basis for
varying degrees of truth. If this mushroom is redder, or more poisonous, than that one,
then it seems to make sense to say that this mushroom is red, or poisonous, to a greater
degree than that one is, and hence that the claim that this mushroom is red, or poisonous,
is true to a greater degree than the claim that that one is.
One feels that something like this idea must have been underlying Sainsbury's claim
that it could be more reasonable to use one mushroom than another to poison Jones, even
when neither mushroom is clearly red or clearly poisonous. The idea must have been that
if you want to poison Jones, then you want him as poisoned as possible; and that if this
mushroom is redder than that one, even if both are borderline cases, then this mushroom
would poison Jones more than that one would. But why should we accept this? On the one
hand, even if you want Jones done in, you may still prefer a healthy, unsuspecting Jones,
to a somewhat sick and suspicious one. On the other hand, it is not at all clear why the
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truth of certain comparatives sllould lead to differing degrees of confidence. If you have two
clearly brown-hence clearly not red-mushrooms, it would be unreasonable to use either
to poison Jones, even if one is redder than the other. Even if one is redder than the other,
you would not be more confident that one is red than that the other one is. Assuming you
are fully informed, you will be completely confident that neither is red. Similarly, given two
clearly red mushrooms, you will not be more confident that one is red than that the other
one is, even if one is redder than the other; you will be completely confident that both are
red. Why should the sitllation be different with borderline cases? It is of course true that if
you are unsure whether it would be correct to say, about each of two things, that it is red
because you are unsure about the proper use of 'red', then you may just be less unsure about
the redder of the two because you think that the redder of the two has a better chance of
being in the extension of 'red' than the other. But we have stipulated that in the imagined
circumstance, your partial confidence does not stem from lack of information-about the
proper use of '1·00' or anything else.
Using the truth of certain comparative claims to justify the possibility of varying
degrees of partial confidence (even for a fully informed subject), and these in turn to jus-
tify varying degrees of truth, seems to raise more questions than it answers. And at any
rate, it remains implausible to retain degree-functionality for degrees of confidence. The
final conception of degrees of truth we are considering bypasses degrees of confidence, and
aims to provide a foundation for degrees of truth by direct appeal to the truth of certain
comparatives. Commitment to degree-functionality remains as problematic as before, how-
ever. It may be that things can be tall to differing degrees, but how could anything be
tall-and-not-tall to any degree? But it is not only the commitment to degree-functionality
that creates problems for the view. If we accept degrees of truth in order to account for the
truth of certain comparatives, then it becomes difficult to see how degrees of truth could
be adapted to account for the semantics of vague predicates. If, for example, we say that
'Michael is taller than Dennis' is true if and only if 'Michael is tall' is truer than 'Dennis is
tall', even when Michael and Dennis are both tall, then we are precluded from identifying
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"complete truth" in the intended sense with the value 1. If degrees of truth are required
r ,
to account for the semantics of 'taller than', then for no a will a is tall be completely
r ,
true, since there could always be a f3 for which f3 is taller than a is true. Similarly, we
are precluded from saying that a is a borderline case of F if and only if (where a names
r ..,
a) a is F has a value between 0 and 1. The predicate 'acute' (as applied to angles) has
r .,
no borderline cases, but still it must he the case that for some a, a is acute has a value
between 0 and 1, since there could be three angles, the first of which is more acute than the
second, and the second of which is more acute tllan the third.23 Thus the account does not
meet my third criterion-namely, that degrees of truth greater than 0 but less than 1 are
properly understood as neither true nor false. Given a continuum of degrees of truth, as
these must be employed in a semantic theory of comparatives, it remains an open question
how complete truth and ("Jmplete falsity map onto this continuum. Degrees of truth, on
this conception, do not do the work they were invuked to do.
2.2 Supervaluations
'~Either Jim is not taller than Eric, or Jim is tall if Eric is." This disjunction seems to have
the status of an analytic truth. How can we provide a semantic theory that will account
for the truth of the disjunction, even when Jim and Eric are both borderline cases of tall?
In Jrder to illustrate the problem, we will compare the following two sentences:
(1) Either Jim is not taller than Eric, or Jim is tall if Eric is.
(2) Either Jim is not taller than Eric, or Jim is bald if Eric is.
Now suppose that the first disjunct in these sentences is false-that is, Jim is taller
than Eric; but that Jim and Eric are each borderline cases of both 'bald' and 'tall'. Any
truth-functional semantic tlleory-one accorliing to which the truth value of a complex
sentence i~ a function just of the truth valtleS of its parts-will verify (2) if it verifies (1).
But when Jim and Eric are eacll borderline cases of 'bald', it does not seem that (2) should
23This example is borrowed from \VilliamsoD (1994, p. 127).
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be verified. Due to what Kit Fine calls a "penumbral connection" between certain predicates
in the language-in this case between 'is taller than' and 'is tall'-if Jim is taller than Eric,
then' Jim is tall if Eric is' should be true, even though 'Jim is bald if Eric is' might not be.
The commitment to degree-functionality emerged as a problem for the degree-theorist for
just this reason. Accounting for "penumbral connections" between vague predicates, while
accommodating their indeterminacy, is the motivation for a semantic theory of vagueness
which has come to be known as supervaluational semantics.24
The defining feature of vagueness, according to Fine (1975), is what he calls "de-
ficiency of meaning." What is meant is illustrated by an artificial predicate of natural
numbers, 'nice!', the meaning of which is given by just the following clauses:
• n is nice! if n > 15
• n is not nicet if n < 13
The predicate 'nice!' is vague, claims Fine, in part because it will be the source of truth-
value gaps in sentences containing it, for example, '14 is nic~! '. But.not only because of this.
What distinguishes truth-value gaps arising from vagueness from those that arise from other
sources is "that they can be closed by an appropriate linguistic decision, viz. an extension,
not change, in the meaning of the relevant expression" (p. 267). Thus we could decide
to count 14 as nice}, or we could decide to count it as not nicet. Neither decision would
constitute a change in, but merely an extension of, the meaning of 'nice} '. In making such
a decision, we will be "precisifying" the meaning of 'nicel'. The idea of supervaluational
semantics is to employ such precisifications in the truth-definition for the language. A
sentence will be true (simpliciter) just in case it would be true on every admissible such
precisification.
A supervaluational model will contain a set of "points"-the admissible precisifi-
cations of the expressions in the language-each of which may be taken to be a classical
24The locus classicus for the theory I will be presenting, as applied to the problem of vagueness, is Fine
(1975). See also, Lewis (1970), Dummett (1975), Dummett (1991, ch. 3). For discussion and criticism of
the view, see Williamson (1994, ch. 5) and Sorensen (1988, pp. 236-239). It should be mentioned that
Fine presents formal considerations which he takes to provide independent motivation for 8upervaluation
semantics.
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model. A sentence will be true in a model just in case it is classically true in every point
in the model. Taking the falsity of a sentence to be the truth of its negation, a sentence
will be false in a model just in case its negation is true in the model, hence just in case
its negation is true in every point in the model, hence just in case it is false in every point
in the model. Let's look at an example. Suppose, for simplicity, that ttall' and 'short' are
the only vague predicates in the language, and that 'tall' is true of everyone 6' or taller,
false of everyone 5'8 or shorter; and that 'short' is true of everyone 5'4 or shorter, false of
everyone 5'9 or taller. A precisification of these predicates will close the gap by expanding
the extensions and anti-extensions of these predicates to cover all undecided cases, leaving
all previously decided cases as before. But there are constraints. In order for a precisifica-
tion to be admissible, it must adhere to what we might call certain meaning postulates. For
example, the gaps must be closed in an orderly way: Anyone taller (shorter) than someone
in the extension (anti-extension) of 'tall' in a precisification must also be in the extension
(anti-extension) of 'tall' in that precisification; anyone shorter (taller) than someone in the
extension (anti-extension) of 'short' in a precisification must also be in the extension (anti..
extension) of 'short' in that precisification. Also, "penumbral connections" between 'tall'
and 'short' must be respected: although each of 'tall' and 'short' may be precisified in such
a way that a 5'8~ inch person is placed in its ~xtension, the extensions of 'tall' and 'short'
in any single precisification must be disjoint-'tall' and 'short' are incompatible predicates.
It is easy to see that every theorem of classical logic is validated on this account: a
theorem of classical logic will be true in every classical model, hence true in every "point"
in a supervaluational model, hence true in every supervaluational model. The account also
manages to verify penumbral trllths like (1). If Jim is taller than Eric, then tJ;m is tall if
Eric is' will he true in every admissihie precisification of 'tall'.
What will be the assessment of the Sorites argument?
Heap (10,OOO)
\:In (Heap (n + 1) ~ Heap (n))
Therefore, Heap (1)
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Both Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are validated by supervaluational seman-
tics. If a universal generalization is true in a model, then it is classically true in each point
in the model; hence each of its instances is classically true in each point in the model;
hence each of its instances is true in the model. If a conditional and its antecedent are true
in a model, hence classically true in each point in the model, then the consequent of the
conditional will also be classically true in each point, hence true in the model.25
AssllDling that 10,000 is in the extension of 'heap' prior to any precisification, that
is, assuming that 10,000 grains of sand definitely can form a heap, 10,000 will be in the
extension of 'heap' in every precisification of the predicate, hence the first premise of the
argument is deemed true. Similarly, the conclusion of the argument is false: 1 will not be
in the extension of 'heap' in any precisification.
What about the second premise-the tolerance principle for 'heap'? It is not deemed
as being neither true nor false, as it is by the degree theorist, but rather just plain false.
In any admissible precisification of 'heap', there will be some n in the extension of 'heap',
while (n - 1) is in its anti-extension. It will not be the same n in every precisification, but
there will always be one. Thus the second premise will have some false instance in every
precisification-different instances in different precisifications, but always at least one (in
fact at most one as well, if the precisification is admissible). Hence the universal will be
false in every precisification, hence false absolutely. The Sorites argument is deemed valid
but unsound.
Although supervaluation semantics, if correct, provides a way of understanding why
the tolerance principle is not true, it cannot really be counted among the proposed solutions
to the Sorites, since it provides an answer to only the third of my four questions. That third
question was: Does reflection on the Sorites paradox require us to accept sharp boundaries
claims for vague predicates-does it require lIB to accept, for example, that for some n, n
2&We are taking an argument ~ to be valid just in case A is true in every model in which every member of
r is true. Williamson (1994) refers to this as "global validity." It may be contrasted with a stricter notion,
which he refers to as "local validity," according to which an argument 5 is valid just in case in every model:
A is (classically) true in ellery point in which every member of r is (classically) true. Universal Instantiation
and Modus Ponens are also both valid on the stricter conception.
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grains can form a heap while (n - 1) grains cannot? And if so, how can we reconcile this
claim with the thought that 'heap' has borderline cases? The 8upervaluationist does require
us to accept the sharp boundaries claim-it is, by his lights, true-but he argues that the
truth of this claim is compatible with the existence of borderline cases, things of which we
cannot truly say either that they are heaps or that they are not. The argument rests on a
distinction between two claims:
• It is true that: 3n(Heap(n + 1) & -,Heap(n))
• For some n, it is true that: (Heap(n + 1) & -,Heap(n))
The supervaluationist, though he affirms the first claim, rejects the second. Although what
we have been calling the sharp boundaries claim for 'heap' is deemed true, none of its
instances are. None of its instances are true since between those i for whicll 'Heap (i)' is
true, and those for which '-, Heap (i)' is true will be some i-the borderline cases-of which
neither is true. Similarly, supervaluational semantics declares some disjunctions true that
have no true disjuncts. For any n, the claim that n is a heap or it isn't will be true, even
though it will not be the case that for any n either the claim that n is a heap will be true or
the claim that it isn't will be true. These results are the cost of providing a semantic theory
which permits truth-value gaps but also verifies those sentences that express penumbral
connections.
Is the cost too high? We cannot help but feel that corresponding to every true
disjunction and existential is a question 'Which one?' that has a right answer. We nlay
say to the snpervaluationist, "you have defined a perfectly good predicate of sentences, but
just because you have spelled it t-r-u-e does not show that it is a truth predicate. That this
predicate may apply to an existentially quantified sentence without applying to any of its
instances is, moreover, evidence to the contrary." The supervaluationist will respond to this
charge, however, by telling us that the phenomenon of vagueness may make it impossible to
accommodate all of our gut feelings. He has at least accommodated many of them, and thus
the burden of proof is on those who would deny the equation of truth with "super-truth".
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Further problems for the account surface, however, once an operator 'Definitely'
(which will abbreviate with a 'D'), used in the object language to express the supervalu-
ationist's conception of truth, is introduced. A provisionally proposed semalltics for this
operator is the following: a sentence DA is true at a point in a model just in case A is true
at evenJ point in the model. The value of DA will remain constant from point to point in a
model, and hence will always be either true or false. Thus, given this provisional semantics,
(which will eventually be modified in order to account for higher-order vagueness), a sen-
tence of the form A 4 DA may not be true. If A, for example, is 'Herbert is bald', where
Herbert is a borderline case, A will be true at some points, false at others. But since the
value of DA does not vary from point to point, the conditional 'If John is bald then it is
definitely the case that John is bald' will be neither true nor false. It is however the case
that a sentence of the form DA will always be a consequence of A-true whenever A is. But
still the gappiness of 'If John is bald then it is definitely the case that John is bald' casts
some doubt on the claim that what 'definitely' expresses is truth.26
But let us grant, for the sake of argument, that the definiteness operator does
indeed have the sense it is intended to have. Still there are problems. With 'definitely'
in the language, we will not only have true disjunctions with no disjuncts that are in fact
true, we will also have true disjunctions with no disjuncts that could be true. In giving an
example, I will use 'BA' as an abbreviation of '-,DA & -,D-,A'. If A is 'Herbert is bald',
then BA may be understood as expressing that Herbert is a borderline case.27 Now consider
the following:
(3) (A & BA) V (.,A & BA)
Take A again to be 'Herbert is bald', and suppose that Herbert is a borderline case.
Then the sentence is true, since equivalent to (A V ...,A) & BA, the first conjunct of which is
26McGee &. McLaughlin (1995) claim that vag'Jeness forces us to recognize that we have two distinct COD-
ceptions of truth, which they call 'truth' and 'definite truth', only the first of which satisfies the disquotatioD
schema.
27On the assumption that every instance of DA -+ A is valid, this definition of the borderline case operator
in terms of the definiteness operator is equivalent to my earlier definition (p. 33) which took the borderline
Ciise operator as primitive: DA =d!/ A & -.BA.
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true, since it is a classical theorem, and the second conjunct of which is true by stipulation.
But not only is neither disjunct of (3) true, neither disjunct could be true. Take the first
disjunct. It is a conjunction, and so in order for it to be true, each of its conjuncts must be
true.28 But if A is true, then DA is true, since a consequence of A. But if DA is true, then
BA is false. Similar reasoning applies to the second disjunct of (3).
It is difficult to say how much of a problem this is for the supervaluationist. Offhand
it may seem that if he is prepared to countenance the truth of a disjunction when neither
of its disjuncts is in fact true, it is not much m,'lre of a step to countenance the truth of
a disjunction when neither of its disjuncts could be true. I would hazard a guess, though,
that if this does not seem much more of a step, it is because the first step already seems
too steep.
Of course, nothing in what I have said so far refutes supervaluational semantics. What is
of primary concern here is that it does not provide the means for answering those questions
that really get to the heart of the Sorites paradox. I offered two reasons for our difficulty
in accepting sharp boundaries claims for vague predicates-one is the thought that, given
an appropriate series, there will be between the positive cases and the negative cases of a
vague predicate some things of which one cannot correctly say either that the predicate
applies or that it does not apply; the other is the thought that given an appropriate series,
any adjacent members of it will have the same status, whether it be positive, negative, or
indeterminate. Supervaluational semantics helps us deal only with one half of the difficulty,
by rendering the first thought compatible with sharp boundaries claims. But it is the
second thought which really underlied our acceptance of tolerance principles in the first
place. Supervaluation semantics, unlike degree-theoretic semantics, gives no indication of
any acceptable revision of the second thought (question 4.); unlike the degree-theory, it
gives no explanation of why we were so attracted to tolerance principles in the first place
281f a conjunction is true in a model, then it is true in every point in the model, hence each of its conjuncts
is true in every point in the model, hence each of its conjuDcts is true in the model.
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(question 2.); and, like the degree-theory, it so far provides no explanation of why we cannot
say which instances of a tolerance principle are not true (question 1.).
Fine (1975) recognizes that there is some pressure to explain at least why, if tolerance
principles for vague predicates are false, we are nonetheless so attracted to them. His
remarks in answer to the question are only very brief, however. I quote those remarks in
full:
I suspect that the temptation to say that the second premiss is true may have
two causes. The first is that the value of a falsifying n appears to be arbitrary.
This arbitrariness has nothing to do with vagueness as such. A similar case, but
not involving vagueness, is: if n straws do not break a camel's back, then nor
do (n + 1) straws. The second calISe is what one migllt call truth-value shift.
This also lies behind LEM [The Law of Excluded Middle]. Thus A V ..,A holds
in virtue of a truth that shifts from disjunct to disjunct for different complete
specifications, just as the sentence 'for some n a man with n hairs is bald but a
man with (n + 1) hairs is not' is true for an n that shifts for different complete
specifications. (p. 286)
It is odd that Fine should cite the arbitrariness of the falsifying n as a cause of our temp-
tation to say that a tolerance principle is true. In many cases, we readily acknowledge that
a tolerance principle is not true, or that a "slippery slope" argument is not a good one,
despite the arbitrariness of the bad step. That is why the claim, "That's the straw that
breaks the camel's back" has such metaphorical weight. If I tug your ear once, you may
not get angry. If I keep tugging your ear, when it is has long ceased to be funny, you will
eventually get angry. There will be some arbitrariness in which of the tugs pushes you over
the edge, but that in no way leads me to believe that if n ear tugs do not provoke your
wrath, then neither will (n + 1).
The second cited cause of our temptation to accept tolerance principles seems to be
tantamount to the claim we are tempted to accept tolerance principles because we do not
recognize supervaluational semantics to be correct. The claim raises a serious methodolog-
ical question. The project of providing an adequate semantic theory of natural languages
is an empirical enterprise. What are we to take as the data of our enterprise? Which are
the phenomena against which we measure our theory for adequacy or correctness? What
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observed phenomena could prove a theory wrong? One of the main motivations for and
attraction of the supervaluationist's theory is that it manages to verify sentences-those
which express penumbral connections-that we are inclined to think true, where truth-
functional theories that admit truth-value gaps cannot. Why is our inclination to regard
trlte existential and disjunctive claims as having a corresponding 'which one?' question that
has a correct ans·wer given any less weight. Fine seems to think that overall best fit with
our intuitions is the best we can hope for in a semantic theory, even when sometimes the fit
is not at all good at certain places.29 Oddly, he does not consider the question whether ac-
ceptance of bivalence might yield an overall best fit. The methodology, and its application,
are unsatisfying.
Nevertheless, we may still wonder whether supervaluational semantics could in some
way be supplemented. One prospect would be to supplement supervaluational semantics
with degrees of truth, with the aim of reclaiming a more complete solution to the paradox.
A sentence would still be deemed true (false) just in case true (false) in all admissible pre-
cisifications of the vague expressions in the language. But in addition to the values true and
false, a continuum of intermediary values would be admitted as well. Very roughly, the idea
would be to take the value of a sentence to be the proportion of admissible precisifications
in which it is true.30 Suppose that 1,500 is the least number for which 'n grains of sand
can form a heap' is true, and that 500 is the greatest number for which it is false, and
that consequently there are 1,000 admissible precisifications of 'n grains of sand can form a
heap'. The predicate will be true of 1,499 in 99.9% of them. The drop in truth value from
any number to its predecessor will be at most l~O. Thus on the combined account, we could
again say, in answer to my fourth question, that although adjacent members in a sorites
series do not always have the same status, they do always have a very similar status.
Would the combined account also provide an explanation of why we are so attracted
to the tolerance principle in the first place? It may not be said, as it could be said on the
29 Cf. Fine (1975, p. 286).
30e/. Lewis (1970, 1979). See Kamp (1975) and McGee &t. McLaughlin (1995) for developments.
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degree-functional theory presented in section 2.1, that we are attracted to the tolerance
principle because it enjoys a very high degree of truth. On the combined account, the
tolerance principle will still be perfectly false-true in no admissible precisification. It
will be the case, however, that every instance of a tolerance principle will be very nearly
true. In the case of the tolerance principle for 'heap', every instance will be true in all but
one admissible precisification.31 Does this fact explain why we are inclined to believe the
tolerance principle itself? McGee & McLaughlin (1995, 236ff.) claim that it does. But there
is a worry. Combining degrees of truth with supervaluations in the way sketched, yields
a conception of a degree of truth as a measure of a kind of probability-the probability
that a sentence would be true if the language were made precise. Now it is not generally
true that whenever we believe each instance of a universal to be highly probable we also
tend to believe the universal itself to be highly probable. Suppose you are being dealt a
single playing card from a normal deck, and consider the claim that for any x, you will
not be dealt an x. (Take the variable to range over the cards in the deck, e.g. the two of
clubs, the queen of spades, etc.) We regard each instance 88 highly probable, but we do
not thereby regard the universal itself as highly probable. We know we will be dealt some
card or other. The explanation must, then, run instead as follows. Because each instance
of the tolerance principle is very nearly true, we mistake each instance as being completely
true. Because we mistake each instance as being completely true, we mistakenly regard the
tolerance principle itself as completely true. What is missing, however, is an explanation of
why we would mistake near truth for complete truth.
At any rat.e, we still lack an answer to the first on my list of questions: Why are we
unable to say which instances of the tolerance principle are not true? In particular, why
can we not say which of its instances has a true antecedent, but an untrue consequent? Put
another way, why can't we find a boundary in our sorites series for 'heap' between the stages
that are definitely heaps and those that are not definitely heaps? The supervaluationist
claims that although for any stage in our heap series, that stage is either a heap or it isn't,
:UWe are still taking 'Heap (x)' to abbreviate In grains of sand can form a heap'.
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we cannot find a boundary between the heap stages and the non-heap stages, since it is
not the case that every stage is either definitely a heap or definitely not one. But given the
semantics so far provided for the definiteness operator, it will be the case that every stage
is either definitely definitely a heap or definitely not definitely a heap-a sentence of the
form 'Definitely: n grains of sand can form a heap' will always be either true or false.
In order to account for the possibility that not only 'Heap (n)', but also 'Definitely:
Heap (n)', may have borderline cases-in order, that is, to account for the possibility of
higher-order vagueness-Fine provides a revised semantics for the definiteness operator.32
On the new account, the structure of a supervaluational model is enriched by introducing
an accessibility relation on points in a model. Instead of saying that DA is true at a point
just in case A is true at every point, we now say that DA is true at a point w just in case
A is true at every point accessible to w. The accessibility relation is not taken as primitive,
however. The structure of each point in a model is also enriched, and the accessibility
relation on those points is determined by that structure.
Instead of taking each point to be an admissible precisification of the expressioIlS in
the language, each point w is, on the new picture, an infinite sequence Wo, WI, W2, ... , the
first term of which is a precisification of the expressions in the language, the secolld term of
which is a set of precisifications, the third term of which is a set of sets of precisifications,
and so on. A constraint placed on these sequences is that each Wi must be a member of
Wi+l. The intuitive idea is that if a predicate F is second-order vague, then not only is
there more than one admissible way of drawing the "oth-order boundary" between the Fs
and the not-Fs, there is also more than one admissible way of drawing the two first-order
boundaries-the boundary between the definitely Fs and the borderline Fs and between
the borderline Fs and the definitely not-Fs. If F is third-order vague, then there will also
be more than one admissible way of drawing the five second-order boundaries; ... if F is
(n+l)th-order vague, there will be more than one admissible way of drawing the (2n +l) nth_
order boundarip's. Each point wO, till, w2, . .. in a model can be understood as representing
32Fine (1975, §5! pp. 2931£.).
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a choice of all such boundaries, each Wi representing a choice of boundaries at the ith order.
The accessibility relation is then defined as follows: a point w' is accessible to a point
w just in case, for each i, w~ is a member of Wi+l. Given this definition and the constraint
on sequences that each term of a sequence be a member of its successor in the sequence,
the accessibility relation will always be reflexive. But it need not be either symmetric or
transitive. Let's look at an example. For simplification, we will assume· that 'n grains of
sand can form a heap' is the only vague predicate in the language. I will use boldface
numerals to denote precisifications-for example, 1,000 is the precisification in which 1,000
is the least number of grains that can form a heap. The model under consideration contains
just three points:
w
W'
w"
=
=
=
7,
8,
9,
{6,7,8},
{T,S,9},
{8,O,tO},
{{6,7,8},{7,8,9}},
{{7,8,9},{8,9,lO}},
{{7,8,9},{8,9,lO}},
... ,
... ,
... ,
for i > 1, Wi+l = {Wi,W~}
for i > 1, W~+l = {wi}
£ • > 1 " - { "}lor I , wi+1 - Wi
w --+ W'~ w"
Given the definition of the accessibility relation, and the structure of these points, the acces-
sibility relation on the points is represented by the diagram. Each point will be accessible
to itself. The arrows indicate which points are accessible to a point in addition to itself.
Now, a 'D'-less sentence is true at a point w just in case it is classically true at Wo.
A sentence DA is true at a puint just in case A is true at every point accessible to it. A
sentence is true in a model, jUBt in case it is "super-true", that is true at every point in the
model. Since not every point in a model need be accessible to every other point, a sentence
DA may be true at some points but not at others, hence neither (super) true, nor (super)
false. For example, in the model given, 'Definitely: eight grains of sand can form a heap' is
true at w but false at w', hence neither true nor false absolutely.
The logic which now results from the semantics given for the definiteness operator
is analogous to the logic for the neces:~ity operator given by the modal system T. If we
exchange 'D's for 'D's, then the sentences validated by the semantics for 'definitely' are the
theorems of T. The consequence relation is not the same for the two systems, however.
Given the definition of truth as truth at every point in a model, as opposed to truth at some
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privileged point in a model (the "actual world"), an inference from A to DA will always
be supervaluationally valid. But DA will not always be a consequence of A in the modal
system T, but rather only in the special case when A is itself valid.
Vagueness of any order is now a formal possibility. Just as in the modal system
T, iterations of 'definitely' are not redundant. Neither DA ~ DDA (the analog of the
84 schema), nor ...,DA -+ D-,DA (the analog of the 85 schema) comes out valid, as long
as every model of the type described is considered relevant for determining validity. The
explanation now offered of our inability to locate a boundary between the things which are
definitely heaps and the things which are not definitely heaps, is that not everything falls
definitely into one of these categories. Between the things that are definitely definitely heaps
and those that are definitely not definitely heaps, will be some things which are neither-a
class of second-level borderline cases. If higher-order vagueness never runs out, then no
matter how many times we iterate the 'definitely' opt::rator, there may always be a class of
borderline cases between the things that are definitely definitely ... definitely heaps, and
those that are definitely not definitely · · · definitely heaps.
But we are not interested in every model of the type described. We are only in-
terested in those in which the set of points in the model can be construed as the set of
admissible points. A point wo, WI, W2, ••• "is admissible,n writes Fine, "if each of its terms
aren (p. 293). It remains an open question whether considerations about admissibility leave
intact those features of the account that are req1.ured in order to accommodate higher-order
vagueness. I think we should be skeptical about the prospects. Sometimes, certain pre-
cisificatioIlS cannot be deemed admissible unless certain other precisifications are deemed
admissible as well. For example, if 1,000 and 1,100 are admissible precisificatioDS, 1,050
must be an admissible precisification as well. But it may also be that certain precisifi-
cations cannot be deemed admissible unless certain other precisifications are not deemed
admissible. Look again at the following:
w = 7, {6,7,8}, {{6,7,8},{7,8,9}}, ... , for i > 1, Wi+l = {Wi, w~}
w' = 8, {T,S,9}, {{7,8,9},{8,9,lO}}, ... , for i > 1, w~+l = {wi}
w" = 9, {8,9,lO}, {{7,8,9},{8,9,lO}}, ... , for i > 1, w~~l = {w~'}
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If w is admissible then its first term is-7 represents an admissible way of drawing
a boundary between the Fs and the not-Fs. But if 7 is an admissible way of drawing that
boundary, how could {S,9,lO}-the second term of w"-be admissible? For it represents 1
as being an inadmissible way of drawing that boundary. How could w and w" be simulta-
neousiyadmissible? The intended answer, presumably, is that just as what is possible from
one perspective may not be possible from another perspective, what is admissible from one
perspective may not be admissible from another perspective. But there is an important
disanalogy. Possible worlds can be coherently thought of as perspectives, since they are the
kind of things we could occupy-they represent a way things could be. But it is difficult
to see how these structured points in the supervaluational model can be understood as the
type of thing from which there is a point of view. Unlike in the original, simpler models for
8upervaluations, these structured points do not actually represent ways our language could
be if it were made more precise. And given the 8upervaluationist's rejection of bivalence,
they certainly cannot represent ways things could bt, 6iven that our language is not precise,
since every sentence is either or true or false in these points.
Were we to add the constraint on admissibility towards which I gestured-namely,
that whenever a point wo, WI, W2, ••• is in a model, a point w~,Wt, w~, ... cannot be in that
model unless, for each i, Wi is in w~+l-werewe to add this constraint on the class of models
relevant for determining validity, the accessibility relation would turn out to be symmetric
and transitive after all. The possibility of higher-order vagueness would be ruled out. At the
very least, without Borne account of what would make two points simultaneously admissible,
we have yet DO reason to accept that the possibility of higher-order vagueness is ruled in.
But even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that the Bupervaluationist has ac-
counted for higher-order vagueness, we are still without an answer to the question why
are we unable to say which instances of a tolerance principle for a vague predicate are not
true. The account of higher-order vagueness provides an explanation only of why we can-
not locate boundaries dividing things of this sort from things of that sort-why we cannot
locate boundaries dividing things of which 'Definitely F' if) true from things of which 'Not
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definitely F' is true; why we cannot locate boundaries dividing things of which 'Definitely
definitely F' is true from things of which 'Not definitely definitely F' is true. The proposed
answer, is that there are always things of a third sort in between. (This is analogous to:
Why can we not find a boundary between the girls and the boys? Because the teacher is in
between.) But we still have no answer to t~Je question, why can we not locate a boundary
dividing things f.)f this sort from everything else? In particular, 'why can we not locate a
boundary dividing the things of which 'Definitely F' is true from the things of which it is
not true. Despite the sophisticated machinery, the supervaluationist is still comlnitted to
the existence of such a point, and cannot explain why we cannot find it.
The pictllIe he offers us is this. We let A be 'n grains of sand can form a heap'.
Vertic(lJ lines represent boundaries.
10,000 grains 1 grain
A I~ -,A
DA I~ ...,DA
DDA I~ -, DDA
DDDA I~ ...,DDDA
DDD···DDDDA I~ ..., DDD·· ·DDDDA
The class of things of which A is true, will be precisely the class of things of which DA is
true (since DA is true whenever A is), which will be precisely the class of things of which
D· · · DA is true, for any number of iterations of the definiteness operator. The class of
things of which -,A is true may be a proper subclass of the class of things of which -,DA is
true, which in turn may be a proper subclass of the class of things of which -,DDA is true.
Bt\t since our series is finite, for some n the class of things of which .DnA is true must
be precisely the class of things of which which -,DDnA is true (where 'Dn, abbreviates n
iterations of 'D'). But if higher-order vagueness never rlIDS out, the gap nlay never close
between the things of which DnA is true and those of which ,DnA is, for any n. That is
why we will not be able to locate a boundary straddled by things of the one sort on one side
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and the things of the other sort on the other. But we have no explanation of why we cannot
locate a bOllndary between the things of the first sort, and everything else. I provide below
a simple model in which higher-order vagueness never runs out. It contains just these six
points:
a - 5, {5,6}, {{5, 6}, {6, 7}}, ... , ai+l = {ai, bi}
b = 6, {6,7}, {{6, 7}, {7, 8}}, ... , bi +1 = {bi' Cj}
c = 7, {7,8}, {{7, 8}, {S, 9}}, ... , Ci+l = {Ci,di}
d = 8, {S,9}, {{8, 9}, {9}}, ... , £4+1 = {di,ei}
e
-
9, {9}, {{9}}, ... , ei+l = {ei}
f - 10, {9, lO}, {{9}, {9, lO}}, ... , fi+l = {ei' Ii}
The accessibility relation, in addition to being reflexive, will be this:
a ---+- b -> c ---+- d ---+- e t--- f
The class of things of which DRA is true is {n : n 2: IO}, for any n. The other classes are
the following:
.,A
.,DA
-,DDA
-,DDDA
-,DDDDDnA
{n: n ~ 4}
- {n: n:::; 5}
{n: n ~ 6}
= {n: n ~ 7}
- {n: n ::; 8}, for any n
Even though higher-order vagueness never runs out, there is still a sharp boundary (between
10 and 9) between the things of which 'DA' is true and the things of which it isn't. Thus
'if 10 grains of sand can form a heap then 9 grains of sand can form a heap' would be that
instance of the tolerance principle with a true antecedent but an untrue consequent. The
commitment to such an instance has not been discharged, and no explanation is provided
for why we cannot identify such an instance.
2.3 Speech Acts and the Sorites
In our discussion of supervaluations, it emerged that once it is taken for granted that
the existence of borderline cases for vague predicates leads to truth-value gaps, we face a
dilemma. The dilemma is that once we admit the gappiness of atomic sentences, we find
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we have conflicting intuitions about the truth-conditions of complex sentences. On the
one hand, we have the intuition that the connectives are truth-functional. We think that
if a disjunction or existential generalization is true, then one of its disjuncts or instances
must be true; we think that if a conjunction or universal generalization is false, then one
of its conjuncts or instances must be false. On the other hand, we are inclined to regard
some complex sentences as true, others as false, in virtue of what they Inean, regardless
of whether their constituents have a truth-value. If Jim is taller than Eric, then we are
inclined to regard'Jim is tall if Eric is' as true, evell when both Jim and Eric are borderline
cases. Following Kit Fine, Jamie Tappenden (1993) calls our intuition that such sentences
are true the penumbral intuition.
It is easy to see that once we admit truth-value gaps (but only then!), our two
intuitions about truth-conditions conflict. When Jim is taller than Eric, we still may not
be inclined to regard 'Jim is bald if Eric is' even when both Jim and Eric are borderline
cases of 'bald'. But this sentence has the same logical structure as the previous example.
One way to resolve the conflict between the "truth-functional intuition" and the penumbral
intuition would be to reject the existence of truth-value gaps. But they are being taken for
granted.
A justification for supervaluational semantics is that it manages to accolnmodate
the penumbral intuition, even if at the expense of the truth-functional intuition. Tappenden
(1993), although he finds the truth-functional intuition to be fairly strong, objects to super-
valuations on another front. Tappenden considers tolerance principles for vague predicates
to be one of those "penumbral" sentences which \\'e were inclined to think true, regard-
less of whether their constituents have a truth-value. He would take a tolerance principle
for 'roughly three feet in length', for example, to express the semantic requirement that
'roughly three feet in length' not have sharp boundaries.33 Since supervaluational seman-
tics falsifies tolerance principles for vague predicates, it does not do the work it was invoked
to do, namely, to verify the penumbral sentences.
33CI. p. 567
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But of course, no semantics we propose should verify tolerance principles for vague
predicates. Thus as long as they are taken to be among the penumbral sentences, the
penumbral intuition that the penumbral sentences are all true cannot be sustained. The
strength of the truth-functional intuition, combined with the fact that the penumbral in-
tuition must be off the mark, leads Tappenden to reject the identification of truth with
super-truth. He adopts instead a truth-functional semantics.34
But even if the penumbral sentences cannot all be verified, the demand that they
be in some way distinguished remains in force. Tappenden provides an account of how
the context-dependence of vague predicates makes it possible to use the resources of the
supervaluational framework to meet this demand. His idea is that vague predicates start
out life as partial-a.~ neither applying, nor failing to apply, to some things. In certain
situations, though, we may have reason to use them "more precisely."
... the extension of a given vague predicate varies according to circumstances.
We augment and relax the precision ofvague predicates. Sometimes more things,
and sometimes fewer things are counted as instances. This happens all the time:
if a certain predicate is appropriate for some linguistic task, but insufficiently
finely calibrated, we may lay down a more precise delineation by fiat. We might
just say: "Let's count these among the heavy ones." (Said of some unclear
cases.) The extent of the indeterminacy a predicate exhibits may be reduced or
increased in a given context. (554)
A predicate is context-dependent, in the sense just indicated, if its extension varies
as it is stipulated that it is going to apply to this or that thing. One would have hesitated,
though, to think of such changes in extension as signaling what we normally think of 88
context-dependence. For the extension of any expression will vary if in a given context we
stipulate that we are going to use it in an idiosyncratic way. If I stipulate that my coffee
cup is going to count as a shoe, and I succeed in saying things about my "shoe," in getting
refills of my "shoe," does that mean that lshoe' is context-dependent? If we construe the
notion of a context-parameter so broadly as to include explicit stipulations, which after
341n particular, he accepts Kleene's strong three-valued tables for the connectives (see p. 27 above), and
the natural extension of these tables to the the quantifiers.
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all just seem arbitrary, does not the notion of context-dependence cease to be interesting?
One might think. But not so, for not all stipulations are as arbitrary as in the 'shoe' case.
Sometimes we can, and do, make stipulations that are not idiosyncratic, but are sanctioned
by our linguistic practices as they stand. In the case of vague predicates in particular,
Tappenden believes that we may "augment and relax" their precision, even by fiat, without
a breach of semantic rules.
In supervaluational semantics, a precisification is an abstract mathematical struc-
ture. III Tappenden's account, a precisification is something we do; its result, a change in
the propositions expressed by sentences of our language. But just as in supervaluational
semantics, there are normative constraints. Some precisifications are admissible while other
are not. I may say, "Let's count these among the heavy ones," while pointing to a bunch of
251b. dumbbells, but if I say, "Let's count these among the yellow oIles," while pointing to
my blue-jeans, I've done something unacceptable. Since stipulations change the extension
of an expression, they also succeed in changing the truth-values of sentences. One natu-
ral way to think of the normative constraints is as taking the form of a requirement that
certain sentences not be falsified by a stipulation. The sentences that may not be falsified
Tappenden calls pre-analytic.
To say tllat a sentence cannot admissibly be falsified is to say that it is not false
in any admissible context-either in a context where no stipulations have been made, or
in one where a predicate has been stipulatively sharpened. Sentences are evaluated with
respect to a single context: the value of a sentence in a context is the value assigned it by
the strong Kleene scheme. But a sentence, in addition to having the truth-value it has in a
context, may be viewed on this account as also having one or more modal values: cannot
be falsified, may be verified, etc.
Given the assumption that some tolerance principles for vague predicates are among
the penumbral sentences, we know that our intuition that the penumbral sentences are all
true cannot be accommodated, since from the assumption that a tolerance principle is true
we can derive absurd consequences. We were left with the problem that tolerance principles
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must nonetheless be in some way distinguished from other claims that cannot be true. But
now, with Tappenden's account of the context-dependence of vague predicates, we have at
our disposal the distinction between the truth-value a sentence has in a given context and
the modal value it has relative to all contflxts. With this distinction in hand, a revised
version of the penllmbral intuition may be accommodated without eschewing the truth-
functional intuition. Instead of saying that the penumbral sentences must all be true, we
may say that they cannot be falsified-that they are, that is, pre-analytic.
But what of the intuition that the sorites premise is true? Have we accounted
for that intuition with the discovery that it cannot be falsified? Tappenden argues that
the modal-value cannot be falsified supports a special kind of speech act. A sentence that
cannot be falsified may on some occasions appropriately be uttered precisely because it
has that value. The story might be told as follows: We left something out of our account
of the context-dependence of vague predicates. We noted that some sharpenings of vague
predicates are admissible while others are not. We identified the constraints on admissibility,
! but we did not explain how those constraints could be enforced. This part of the picture
still needs to be filled in.
The suggestion as to how the constraints come to be enforced is that if someone
proposes an inadmissible sharpening of a predicate, one that falsifies some pre-analytic
sentence, vIe may induce them to retract their proposal by uttering the very sentence they
have inadmissibly falsified. Suppose we are inspecting a sorites series of men, varying in
height from 5'6 to 6', and you decide to propose a sharp boundary between the ones who
are roughly 6' tall and the ones who are not roughly 6' tall. Well, in Tappenden's view, you
have done something inadmissible and I may try to induce you to retract your proposal by
uttering "But if a man is roughl:J 6' tall, then so is any man only one millimeter shorter
than him." I had better not, however, have asserted the sentence. I better not, that is,
have been trying to convey to you what I believe to be the case, since the sentence I have
uttered is not true-cannot be true. But if the point of my utterance was just to enforce
the constraint that you defied, then we need not say that I have asserted it. Rather, I've
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performed some other speech act. In Tappenden's terms, I have articulated it.
The accounted is well-suited to provide an answer to the second on my list of ques-
tions: if tolerance principles for vague predicates are not true, why are we so attracted
to them in the first place? The answer is that we mistake our good reasons for uttering
tolerance principles on certain occasions as reason to believe them. We think they may be
correctly a.~serted, because they may on occasion be correctly articulated. Because some
tolerance principles may not admissibly be falsified, it will also be the case that sharp
boundaries claims for vague predicates may not admissibly be verified. Sharp boundaries
claims for vague predicates are not true in any context. Thus the answer to the third of
my fOUf questions is that despite the Sorites paradox, we are not required to accept such
claims; in any context, a vague predicate will have at least some borderline cases, in the
sense that there will be things (possible things if not actual things) to which they neither
apply nor fail to apply.
One may wonder, though, whether the articulability of tolerance principles really
does explain why are we attracted to them. A problem for the explanation, unacknowledged
by Tappenden, is that a tolerance principle for a vague predicate Inay have exactly the same
privileged status as its denial. It may be inadmissible to stipulatively use vague predicates
in such a way that falsifies Oltr tolerance principle for 'heap', for example. But it is also
inadmissible to stipulatively use vague predicates in such a way that falsifies the claim that
that for some n, n grains of sand can form a heap while (n - 1) grains cannot. Given
the semantics Tappenden accepts, the sharp boundaries claim could only be false if either
every number of grains could form a heap, or no number of grains could. But surely no
such stipulation is admissible, as in fact it is not by Tappenden's own lights. He requires
that clear cases be preserved by stipulation-if a sentence has a truth value in absence of
any stipulation, it must have that same truth-value on any admissible precisification. Thus
if someone stipulates that 1,000 grains of sand is to count as being able to form a heap,
and also they stipulate that if a number of grains is to count as being able to form a heap,
then so is a number one less than it, then they have done something inadmissible. We may
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induce them to retract their stipulation by uttering, "But look, there's got to be a cut-off
point somewhere." The proposed account of the context-dependence of vague predicates,
the modal values a sentence has relative to those contexts, and the speech acts those modal
values support, is unable to maintain a distinguished status for tolerance principles that it
does not also ascribe to sharp boundaries claims. Since it turns out, on this account, that
a sentence we are inclined to reject has the very same privileged status as sentences we are
inclined to accept, the status can no longer be cited as explanation of our inclinations, and
the account loses much of its appeal.
Another problem for the account is the limited extent of its application. It only
covers a special class of vague predicates, those which Tappenden would, I gather, call
"essentially vague." Examples are 'roughly three feet in length', 'shortish', 'about 12:00'.
For these predicates there genuinely does seem something wrong with stipulating sharp
boundaries. It does seem that someone does something impermissible by saying, "Show up
for dinner about 7:00, by which I mean no earlier than 6:56 and no later than 7:12." But
with other vague predicates, for example 'too heavy to be lifted safely', it seems perfectly
admissible to stipulate sharp boundaries on occasion. Tappenden thinks so too. He writes:
Someone drafting occupational health and safety regulations might specify pre-
cise boundaries by writing something like: "All objects too heavy to be lifted
safely (i.e., over 90 kg.) must be moved with a forklift.
But clearly, the stipulation falsifies the sentence: if a weight is too heavy to be lifted
safely, then so is a weight one milligram less than it. If the stipulation was admissible, then
the sentence is not pre-analytic, hence not articulable. But still, in absence of stipulations
like those above, aren't we tempted to think it true?
The only way to save the account is to change our minds and deem the above stip-
ulation inadmissible after all. But what could be the justification for doing this? Certaiuly
the stipulation seems admissible. Our intuitions about which stipulations are admissible
is what we are taking to be a starting point. It is these intuitions that we are aiming to
describe and explain. As it turned out, according to Tappenden anyway, the description
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and explanation of the phenomenon that some stipulations are adm.issible and others not,
provided us with a resource for explaining why sorites premises have such a grip on us. The
option is not available to us to turn the account upsidedown and falsify the phenomena we
were trying to describe in order to keep this account of the sorites.
2.4 Vagueness as Ignorance
All of the accounts we have so far considered reject bivalence for sentences containing vague
predicates in order to account for the existence of borderline cases. None of the accounts we
have so far considered has been able to provide a satisfactory answer to the first on my list of
questions: Why are we unable to say which instance or instances of the tolerance principle
for 'heap' (or any other vague predicate) are not true? One justification for the rejection
of bivalence given our inabilit~l to decide in some cases whether or not a vague predicate
applies, is the view that in such cases there no hidden facts; our knowledge of the nleaning
of vague predicates makes it always possible in principle for us to be in a position either
to know that a predicate applies to an object if it does apply to that object, or to know
that it doesn't if it doesn't. Our inability to say which instances of the tolerance principle
are not true, however, should cast doubt on this idea. If we were always able to place a
'heap' sentence in the true category if it belongs in that category, and the "everything else"
category when it doesn't, then we would be able to say just which instances of the tolerance
principle are not true.
This has led some philosophers to believe that grounds for rejecting biva.lence in the
face of borderline cases are not solid, while the costs of rejecting bivalence are too high.
Given bivalence, the explanation of our inability to locate boundaries of any sort for vague
predicates is that in some cases the facts about the applicability of a vague predicate are
simply unknown to us. Timothy Williamson (1994) is the first proponent of this epistemic
view of vagueness to provide an explanation of our ignorance in such cases.35 The claiIIl is
that our ignorance is a consequence of the fact that we have inexact knowledge of which
350ther advocates of the epistemic view are Sorensen (1988)>> Cambell (1974), and Cargile (1969).
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properties are expressed by vague predicates. The extensions of vague predicates are not
determined by natural or stipulated boundaries, but rather in some mysterious way by the
total pattern of their UBe. Our learning of vague predicates is essentially limited, and so the
possibility that vague predicates might express anyone of number of very similar properties
is compatible with our experience and training in the use of them. It might just be that
'tall' (for a man) applies to a man just in case in is at least 6'1. But it is possible that we
might have had just the same experiences we in fact had, but due to a slight difference in
the overall use of the predicate, the cut-off point might have been just slightly lower instead.
Thus we cannot know that it expresses the one property rather than the other.
But if 'tall' expresses a precise property, and we don't know which property that is,
how can it be that we know that a 6'5 person is tall, or that a 5'5 person is not? Williamson
argues that margin for error principles that govern inexact knowledge in general, also govern
inexact knowledge of meaning in particular. Suppose you're at Fenway Park. You know
that the seating capacity is about 34,000. You can see that there are very few empty seats.
You know that there are more than 20,000 people in the stadium, and less than 50,000.
But you do not know that there are not exactly 33,000. If there are exactly 33,000 people,
then you will not know that there not exactly 32,999 people. The scene that would be
before your eyes if there were 32,999 people would be too similar to the scene in fact before
your eyes for you reliably to be able to judge the difference. A margin of error is required
for your judgment to be a reliable one. The situation is similar in the case of our inexact
knowledge of vague predicates. We kno'v that 'tall' does not apply to a man of 5'5. We
know that does apply toa man of 6'5. But if a man of 6'1 is the shortest man to which
'tall' applies, we cannot know this. Had it instead been the case instead that a man of 6'0 190
was the shortest man to which 'tall' applies, our training in the use of the predicate would
not have been different enough, if different at all, for us reliably to be able to judge that
'tall' expressed the one property rather than the other. Our knowledge of the applicability
of 'tall' gives out as we approach the boundary.
Given Williamson's acceptance of classical logic and semantics, the tolerance prin-
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ciple for 'heap' (for example) will have exactly one untrue instance. That instance will have
a true antecedent and a false consequent. Williamson is able to explain why we cannot
discover which instance that is, where the accounts we have previously considered have not
been able to. We cannot discover the false instance of the tolerance principle, since in order
to know of the false instance that it is the false instance, we would have to know that its
antecedent is true and that its consequent false-we would have to know where the bound-
ary is between those numbers of grains of sand that can form a heap, and those numbers
of grains that cannot. But in order to know this, we would have know that 'heap' did not
express some very similar property. But this we cannot know, because our knowledge of
the truth-conditions for sentences containing 'heap' is inexact. Williamson requires us to
accept sharp boundaries claims for vague predicates but, in answer to my third question,
argues that the existence of sharp boundaries is compatible with the existence of borderline
cases. There is always a fact of the matter about whether a thing is heap. The essence of
borderline cases is our inability to know the facts.
Williamson's solution of the Sorites paradox is incomplete, however. It provides no
explanation of why we were so attracted to the tolerance principle in the first place. I have
inexact knowledge of the number of people at the ballpark. But I am in no way inclined to
believe that if there are n people, then there are also (n - 1) people. Nor does Williamson's
provide any indication of whether we can recover, in some revised form, a version of the
thought that adjacent members of a sorites series must have the same status. In the next
chapter, I will propose answers to all of my four questions. I concur \vith Williamson's view,
that in order to explain why we cannot locate the boundaries for vague predicates, some
ignorance of facts must be postulated. I do not find, however, that our ignorance has just
the same source tllat Williamson finds it to have.
Chapter 3
A Solution to the Sorites
Nearly Everyone Could Accept
In this chapter I present a solution to the Sorites paradox that appeals to a certain kind
of context-dependence. It is frequently acknowledged that vague predicates are context-
dependent-that for example, an utterance of 'Mr. X is tall' might express a truth in most
situations, and yet not express a truth, if Mr. X is a basketball player, during a conversation
about the NBA draft. Our initial description of the phenomenon might be that in some
contexts 'tall' means tall for a man, while in other contexts it may mean tall for a basketball
player. The content of the utterance is not constant. It must seem to many philosophers
that the context-dependence of vague predicates could be of no use in solving the Sorites,
since even when contexts are fixed, the paradox still arises. We are as inclined to accept a
tolerance principle for the predicate 'tall for a basketball player' 88 we are inclined to accept
one for 'tall', and for that reason it must seem acceptable when dealing with the Sorites to
treat vague predicates as if they were not context-dependent at all. I shall argue, however,
that vague predicates are context-dependent in more than one way; that in particular they
are context-dependent in a way that cannot be abstracted from when dealing with the
Sorites, and which does provide resources for solving it.
67
68 CHMTER3. ASOLUTIONTOTHESOmT~
3.1 Comparison Classes and Standards of "Precision"
In order to get a feel for the ways in which vague predicates can be context-dependent, I
would like to begin with a brief comment on David Lewis's (1979) discussion of vagueness
in 'Scorekeeping in a Langu3ge Game'.l Lewis describes the context-dependence of vague
prf,dicates as a variation in the "standards of precision" that are "in force" in a conversation:
Austin's "France is hexagonal" is a good example.... Under low standards
of precision it is acceptable. Raise the standards of precision and it loses its
acceptability (245).
In Lewis's sense, to increase our standards of precision for a vagne term is to count fewer
things among its positive instances. This is to be contrasted with increases in precision
in Tappenden's sense, where to increase our standards of precision for a vague term is to
count more things among its definite instances-to narrow the gap between its extension
and anti-extension.
It is misleading, however, to think of the differing standards, in Lewis's sense, as
being standards of precision. The reason it may seem appropriate to describe them that
way, is that 'hexagonal', like the other vague predicates Lewis discusses-'bald' and 'flat',
have precise uses. In the limit case, 'bald' may mean has absolutely no scalp hair, and 'flat'
may mean has absolutely no bumps. The more hair or bumps we permit a thing to have
while still counting it as bald or flat, the less precisely (we might say) we are using the
expressions. The use may be called less precise because it is less like the precise use. But
any departure from precision is really as imprecise as any other.
Moreover, vague predicates like 'tall' or 'rich' which do not have limit cases, and
hence cannot have precise uses, may still be used with varying "standards of precision" in
Lewis's sense, because on different occasions more or fewer things may be counted as positive
instances. There is no precise use of 'taU' or 'rich', however, to which these different uses
can be compared. It is probably better, then, to think of the differing standards in the use
of vague predicates as being stricter or more lax, and not as more or less precise.
1All page references will be to the reprint of the article in (Lewis 1983).
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Using vague predicates with dilferent standards in different circumstances is a fairly
widespread practice, I think, and not an occasional indulgence. The ends of communication
are so varied that is very economical to have a language that licenses variations in the
standards of use of its predicates. We speak to explain why things happened ("He voted
for the proposal because he's rich"), to get people to do things ("Please hand me the red
one"), to caution them ("That's slippery"). If we did not have some discretion to ~ary our
standards as it suits our purposes, we would either have to have a very large vocabulary or
speak very long sentences in order to achieve our communicative ends. If the book I want
is sitting amongst a pile of green books, why should I be required to say, "Please hand me
the one that's sort of a cross between brick red and burgund)· but on the brownish side,"
when a mere 'red' would do.
One question to ask is whether the vuriation in our standards carries the truth along
with it. If I say that the book is red on one occasion and not red on another, can it be that
I have spoken truly both times? It has always been a guiding principle in the philosophy
of language to take our disposition to utter a sentence in a situation as indication that
the sentence is true in that situation. I find it difficult to see that the principle needs any
defense; the burden of proof lies with those who deny it. It is not so much that we want
to pursue a strategy of verifying as much of what people say as possible. People make
mistakes all the time-they speak falsely all the time. Any account of the truth-conditions
of our utterances that verified as much of what people say as possible would have it, for
example, that 'The world is flat' has changed in meaning, and for that reason would surely
be incorrect. Rather, we only apply the principle when it is safe to assume (or better,
possible to ensure) that a ~peaker is not misinformed, misperceiving, misunderstanding,
miscalculating or misremembering, and so OD. Once it is understood that the principle has
only this limited application, it should seem like a truism. Accepting it should seem no
worse than accepting the principle that if a sentence would be uttered in a situation by an
honest and omniscient speaker of our language-one who has communicative ends like ours)
and also an interest like ours in economy of speech-if a sentence would be uttered by such
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a speaker in a situation, then we are to take that as indication that the utterance is true in
that situation.
An important shift in the philosophy of language was to reject a corresponding
principle that if a sentence would be refrained from being uttered in a situation by an
honest and informed speaker, then we are to take that as indication that the utterance is
not true in that situation. Our resistance to uttering certain sentences in certain situations
can often be expl~jnedwithout appeal to either lack of truth on the part of the utterance or
lack of information on the part of the utterer, when conversation is understood as a form of
rational, coopprative behavior.2 Once the corresponding principle is rejected, however, one
might wonder whether the original principle should be rejected on similar grounds: if we
often refrain from uttering true sentences when so doing would not contribute effectively to
the cooperative enterprise, then perhaps we also often utter untrue sentences just because
doing so would contribute effectively to the cooperative enterprise. I cannot undertake a
full-scale defense of my position here, but my position is to accept the original principle-
that is, I will take the sincere, informed utterance of a sentence in a situation to be an
indication of the truth of the utterance in that situation; hence I assume that the variation
in our standards for, e.g., 'red' does carry the truth alocg with it. Accepting the principle
proves fruitful, and anyway, not accepting the principle would leave us \vith little else to go
Oll.
Another question we should ask is whether every variation in the standards of use
of vague predicates should be accounted for by a variation in comparison class. We opened
the chapter by noting that sometimes 'tall' may be used to mean tall for a basketball player,
while other times it way be used to mean just tall for a m,an. Different conlparison classes
for 'tall' may be salient in different contexts. When we say that France is hexagonal, we may
mean something like hexagonal for a country. But when I say, "LBM is the red one" when it
is sitting amongst a pile of dark-green books, but "LBM is the brown one" when it is sitting
amongst a pile of fire-engine red books, should we also attribute this to a difference in the
20/., for example, Grice's Logic and Conve,"sation in Grice (1989) and Stalnaker (1973, 1974, 1975).
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salience of one or another comparison class? It is difficult to answer this question without
a theory in hand of exactly how the salience of comparison classes affects the content of an
utterance. But I would like to give some reasons why, in the abstract, we should suspect
that not every variation in standards can be made to fit into the comparison class mold.
If the variation in our standards for 'red', as displayed in the LBM example, is to be
accounted for by a variation in comparison class, then the comparison class that is salient
in each case must be something like: the class of books LBM is piled with. Now assume
that 'F for class C' means 'meets some minimal standard for F-ness, and is also F-er than
the mean average for class C'. Then 'tall for a basketball player' would be true of X just
in case X meets some minimal standard for tallness, and X's height is taller than the mean
height of basketball players. Also assume that it is possible somehow to average the color of
a group of books, and that given the mean color of a pile containing LBM and dark-green
books, the color of LBM is indeed redder than that mean, but not redder than the mean
color of a pile containing LBM and fire-engine red books. If we make these assumptions,
then it looks as if the variation in our stalldards for 'red' in this case can be accounted for as
a variation in the salience of one or another comparison class. Nevertheless, I do not think
the first assumption can be justified. The truth conditions for 'X is F for class C' cannot be
a function just of the mean F-ness of members of C. Nor will choosing some measure other
than the mean-such as the mode, or the mean average of the F-est 50%-do the trick. We
can imagine the NBA, fifteen years from now, being composed entirely of tall players. It is
not merely that we could now say without contradicting ourselves, "I wonder whether in
fifteen years the NBA will be composed entirely of tall players," using the class of present
players as our comparison class. We can imagine being able to say truly, fifteen years from
now, "The NBA is composed entirely of tall players.u The problem, in a nutshell, is that
the satisfaction-conditions for predicates of the form 'is F for class C' require class C to
form a kind, for they depend on some conception of what a typical member of the kind as
a whole is like, and not just what is typical for its presently existing instances.
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The problem is compounded when we consider variations in standards which if they
were to be understood as standards relative to some comparison class, the comparison class
would have to be a class containing only one member. Imagine that I and my friend Linda
are two casting agents. I'm auditioning actors to play Mikhail Gorbachev in a movie. Linda
is auditioning actors to play the part of Yul Brenner. We can imagine that Linda and I turn
actors away all day, citing their lack of baldness as the reason. At the end of the day, at last,
a perfect Gorbachev shows up, aiid I say, "Finally! Someone bald!" My perfect Gorbachev,
however, is someone that Linda earlier turned away for the part of Yul, due to his lack of
baldness. Linda and I have been using different standards. If the difference in standards
is to be accounted for as a difference in comparison class, then we have only two choices
for what that comparison class might be. One option is to take the comparison classes to
be singletons in each case-the class containing Yul and the class containing Mikhail. The
option is ruled out, I think, because we have no conception of what a typical member of a
class is lik~ when the class has only one member.
The other option wou~d be to take the comparison classes to consist of people whose
hair coverage is like Yul's or like Mikhail's. I think the strategy should not be pursued. If
we try to make the variation in the standards of our use of 'bald' fit the comparison class
mold, we will not be able to account for an important semantic difference between the two
sorts of context-dependence.
To illustrate the difference, we ,viII introduce another example. Imagine now that
Linda and I are doing the casting. for a documentary about tall pets. We spend the day
auditioning pets, in hopes of finding tall cats, tall dogs, tall hamsters, tall canaries, and so
on. But we have no luck. At the end of the day, when I arrive home and am asked how
my day was, I complain, "It was horrible. None of the animals we auditioned were tall."
Evidently, this is an appropriate way of conveying that none of the mice we auditioned
were tall for a mouse, and none of the iguaIIBS we auditioned were tall for an iguana, and
so on. The logical form of the sentence I uttered is not -.3x(x was tall for C), but rather
something more like: -,3x(x was tall for x's type). There is not a Ilnique, most salient
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comparison class that is relevant for evaluating the utterance. The comparison class seems
to occupy a position that can be bound by the existential quantifier.3
Now return to the example where Linda and I are holding auditions for the parts
of Yul Brenner and Gorbachev. But this time suppose that my perfect Gorbachev goes
for a drink after being rejected for the part of Yul, and never returns to tryout for the
part he was made for. Now when I return home and am asked how my day was, I cannot
claim, "It was horrible. None of the actors we auditioned were bald." I may say that none
of the actors we auditioned were bald enough, but I cannot say simply that none of them
were bald. Why? That would imply that we wanted someone bald to play Gorby, and that
by the very same standard none of the Yul auditioners were bald. But that is not what
happened. Unlike the comparison classes for 'tall' in the pet case, the different standards
for 'bald' used by Linda and me do not seem to occupy a position that can be bound by
the existential quantifier. We should conclude that two different sorts of context-dependent
are at work in the two examples. This squares well with the intuitive appeal of saying that
by 'bald' Linda and I both meant bald for a man.
The above exarnple shows, I think, that keeping comparison classes fixed from con-
text to context will not be sufficient to render vague predicates context-invariant. The
predicates 'bald for a man' and 'tall for a basketball player', just like 'bald' and 'tall', are
context-depen(lent since they may be used with more or less strict standards on different
occasions. Once this is recognized, the context-dependence of vague predicates cannot be
so easily ignored when discussing the Sorites paradox, since it is not the case that for each
of the different standards of use of 'tall', for example, there is some context-invariant com-
plex predicate in the language which can be argued to be equally vague. Thus it cannot
be assumed that the Sorites paradox still arises once all contextual elements relevant to
determining the truth-conditions of sentences containing vague predicates are fixed. My
view is that not only can this not be assumed, it is precisely not the case.
3Far discussion of binding hidden variables I and whether they should be syntactically represented, see
Partee (1989).
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3.2 Constraints on Standards and the Sorites Paradox
We have a lot of leeway in the standards we use for vague predicates, but still, we cannot
use them any old way we like. What are the constraints? Well first, there are what we Inay
call normative constraints. For each predicate, there will be a limited range of cases which
it will be permissible to count as positive instances. We can never use the word 'green' in
such as way as to apply to the color of the sun. For each predicate there will also be a
class of things which it will be mandatory to count as positive instances. No matter what
standard is in place for 'blue', the predicate applies to the color of a clear afternoon sky.
There will also be relational constraints for some predicates: Whatever standard is in place
for 'tall', anything the same height as or taller than something that meets the standard
itself meets the standard.4 A further sort of constraint will coordinate the standards in
use for related predicates: Whatever standards are in use for 'rich' and 'poor', nothing can
meet both, and it must be possible for something to meet neither.
Are these the only sorts of constraints? I think not. The standards in use for
a predicate may be constrained by the nature of the immediate surroundings. Here's an
example. You and I are waiting in the airport, and I want to make some remark about
a man in the vicinity. I can't point, because he will see me. So while looking away ever
so casually, I whisper to you, "See that guy over there by the water fountain, the one
with mustache?" But by now, there are three men by the water fountain, two of which
have a mustache. "Which one?" you ask, "Is he tall?" I have a choice to Inake. If ray
man is appreciably taller than the other man with a mustache, then I may answer "yes."
Alternatively, I could answer, "He's not tall, but he's around 5'11." My response sets the
standard.
Now suppose there are two men talking to each other, whom I wish to point out to
you. You ask, "Are they tall?" If the two nlen are pretty much the same height, I may not
choose a standard that one meets but the other doesn't, even if one is just noticeably taller.
4A qualification may be required here. If basketball players are the salient comparison class, then a
sky.,craper may not meet the standard in place for 'tall'. Something cannot be tall for a basketball player
unless it is a basketball player-I don't think.
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The option is not available to me to set a standard that divides the two.
On the other hand, we may use stendards for vague predicates that do divide similar
pairs, as long as the similarity of the pair can for some reason be set aside, or ignored.
Imagine an eccentric art collector who keeps all and only her paintings containing just red
pigments in one room, and all and only her paintings containing just orange pigments in
another. One day she is presented as a gift a painted color spectrum ranging from primary
red on one end, to orange on the other. She resolves to cut the canvas in half. If she cuts
without thinking, perhaps in a state of mad excitement because she is so eccentric, she will
most likely cut in just the right place, and once the halves are re-framed and hung, she may
still proclaim, with pride, that all and only her paintings containing just red pigments are
in one room, and all and only her paintings containing just orange pigments are in another.
If the decision about where to cut is labored, in contrast, she will likely find herself unable
to locate the boundary between the red and the orange, the pigments on either side of any
proposed cut being too obviously similar for one to go in the red rOODl and the other in the
orange.
The proposed account of what is going on in the preceding examples, is that vague
predicates are context-dependent in a special sort of way. If the similarity of two objects is
not relevant, then one may be in the extension of a vague predicate while the other is not.
If their similarity is made relevant, however, the extension changes and they are either both
in or both out.
What answers does the account provide to the list of questions I earlier specified as
being the questions (p. 23) to answer when solving the Sorites? The first question I posed
,vas: why can't we say which instances of the tolerance principle are not true? Our answer
is that in considering any particular instance, say 'If 486 grains of sand can form a heap
then so can 485', we invoke a context in which that instance is true, since by assessing it,
we make the similarity of 486 and 485 relevant. On a related front, to answer the second
question, we are attracted to the tolerance principle because it is very natural to think that
a universal is true, given that each of its instances is true when we assess that instance.. Our
76 CHAPTER 3. ASOLUTIONTOTHESOmT~
mistake is that we don't recognize that the iustances are not all true evaluated with respect
to a single context. Though there may be a sharp boundary that divides the heaps from
the non-heaps, we could not inspect that boundary without it ceasing to be a boundary, for
by inspecting the boundary we change the context relative to which 'heap' is evaluated. If
there are sharp boundaries, we cannot find them, because they are not stable.
We will put off answering the third questiOJl for the moment, and move on t~· the
fourth: Can some revised version of the tolerance principle be recovered? When the ques-
tion was initially posed, I suggested twu forms that such a revision might take. The first
suggestion was that the revision take the form of a qualification: all adjacent pairs of stages
in our series that meet conditiol1 C always have the same status. The second suggested form
was this: every stage bears some special relation R to adjacent stages, which it does not
bear to more distant stages-where R should be in some way like 'has the saRle status as'.
The degree-theorist proposed a revision taking the second form, by letting 1l be has a status
very similar to. I propose a revision taking the first form by letting C be the condition that
the similarity of the pair is relevant. It is not surprising that we would not have noticed
the requirement that the condition obtain, because we can't think of an adjacent pair in
the series that doeSll't meet the requirement (while we're thinking of it, anyway).
Now what about the third question? Can we sOlnehow, despite the Sorites paradox,
resist accepting the sharp boundaries claim, and in sonle way maintain the idea that vague
predicates 11ave borderline cases, and if so how? I want to stress that nothing in my account,
as so far presented, commits us one way or the other to a verdict on tIle existence of trutll-
value gaps, nor to a verdict on the truth of the sharp boundaries claim. I have so far not
said anything about whether the standards in use of a vague predicate must cover all cases,
in the sense that once a standard is in place, everything either meets the standard or it
doesn't.5 Nor have I said anything about whether once a standard is in place, different
things can meet the standard to varying degrees. As far as I am concerned, my account can
51 did actually suggest at one point that the standards do cover all cases. But that was just for ease of
exposition, and nothing in my answers to questions 1-3 depends on it.
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and should' be adopted by all parties.
Without an account of higher-order vagueness, the degree-theorist seemed commit-
ted to the existence of a sharp boundary between the things that satisfy a predicate to
the highest degree, and those things that satisfy it to a degree less than one. Thus he
seemed unable to explain why we cannot say which instances of the tolerance principle are
(completely) true, and which instances are not .. If the degree-theorist combines the account
presented here with his own, then he can explain why we cannot find tb,e boundary between
the things that do and the things that don't satisfy a predicate to the highest degree. And
he can do this without an account of higher-order vagueness, in fact without even accepting
the existence of higher-order vagueness.
Just to give a quick sketch: the degree-theorist could adroit that vague predicates
are used with different standards on different occasions, and could adopt the constraints
on standards proposed here, only in a modified form that accords with his understanding
of truth. For example, the degree-theorist's modified normative constraint would be: for
each predicate there will be some cases such that it is pennissible to adopt a standard for
the predicate which the cases meet to degree 1 (0); there will also be some cases such that
it is mandatory to adopt a standard for the predicate which those cases meet to degree 1
(0). Our relevant similarity constraint would be put in the following way: if it is relevant
in a context that a and b are similar (in the respect relevant for F), then if a satisfies F to
degree 1 (0) in that context, so does b. The reason, then, that we cannot find that instance
of the tolerance principle which has a perfectly true antecedent but not a perfectly true
consequent, is that in G :cssing any instance, we invoke a context in which the standard for
'heap' is met to degree 1 by both or neither.
The supervaluation-theorist was in a worse-off position than the degree-theorist
with respect to our list of questions. The supervaluation-theorist could not provide any
explanation of why, if the tolerance principle is (super-) false, we are nonetheless so inclined
to accept it. Nor was the supervaluation-theorist able to recover an acceptable revision of the
tolerance principle. The supervaluationist's account of higher-order vagueness, moreover,
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provided no explanation for our inability to say which instances of the tolerance principle
are untrue.
The supervaluation-theorist can, however, also supplement his account of vagueness
with ours. The two accounts, in combination, would then provide what I would regard
as a complete solution to the Sorites. What would the combined account look like? In
each context, the standard in use for a predicate has an extension (the things that meet
the standard) and an anti-extension (the things that do not meet the standard), which are
disjoint but not required to jointly exhaust the domain. The supervaluationist'8 definition
of t.ruth as super-truth may then be relativized to contexts.6 Iu adding to his picture the
account proposed here of how the context constrains the available choice of standards, the
supervaluation-theorist loses nothing, but gains the resources to provide answers to all of
questions 1-3, without being required to account for higher-order vagueness.
The epistemic-theorist was in somewhat of a better-off position than the supervalua-
tionist, insofar as his view proved well-suited to explain why we cannot know which instance
of the tOlerance principle is untrue. But still the accollnt was lacking. I think it should be
obvious by now that there is no formal bar to combining the view advanced by Williamson
with the account presented here. Instead of holding that a sentence containing a vague
predicate expresses just the same bivalent proposition on every occasion of its use, and that
we have inexact knowledge of what proposition that is due to our limited exposure to uses
of the predicate, the combined view would hold that that a sentence containing a vague
predicate may express differerlt bivalent propositions on different occasions, and that on
each occasion we have inexact knowledge of which proposition that is. It is this combined
view t~lat I accept.
On the view I affirm, then, no matter what standard is in use for a vague predicate,
there will be things that meet the standard although we cannot know that they meet the
standard, and there will be things that do not meet the standard although we cannot know
6St alnaker (1987) and Lewis (1970, 1979) relativize supervaluations to contexts in this way. Lewis adds,
in addition, Don-degree-functional degrees of truth, where the degree of truth of a sentence lS determined by
a measure function on the set of admissible precisifications.
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that they do not meet the standard. The severity of this position is rather softened though,
I think, once one recognizes that it is compatible with the common sense view that when
we know a person's height, for example, we know enough to correctly assess whether or not
that person is tall. How could the position I take possibly be compatible with the common
sense view? How could it be that we are always able to correctly assess whether a person
is tall, \vhen there are things that are unknowably tall and things that are unknowably not
tall? In order to demonstrate the possibility of compatibility, I must provide the proper
restatement of the common sense view: when we know a person's height, we know enough
to correctly assess whether or not that person is tall, in the sense that when we do assess
whether or not that person is tall, the standard in use for 'tall' will be such that we can
know whether the person meets it. When we are not assessing whether that person is tall,
however, when for whatever reason we are able to conveniently ignore the fact that his
height is very similar to the height of people just slightly shorter or taller than him-when
that height is out of our view, so to speak. The standard in use for 'tall' at that time
may just be such that he is the shortest person to meet it. The picture is this: we cannot
locate the boundaries for vague predicates because the boundaries will never be where we
are looking, but the Hip side is that wherever we are looking, we may know which side of
the boulldary we are OD.
An initial worry about my proposal will be that it seems to require that there is always at
least one pair of heights the similarity of which is not relevant-there must always be at
least one place that the boundary between the tall and the not tall could be. But when
we are confronted with a sorites series of men, ranging from five-foot on one end to seven-
foot on the other, each differing in height from his neighbor by only a millimeter, then the
similarity of every adjacent pair will be extremely relevant, and so given my constraint that
boundaries cannot separate relevantly similar pairs, there will be no place for the boundary
to be. But surely it cannot be that none of the men in the series are tall, and surely it must
be that at least some of them are.
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One option available to me \vould be to argue that although it is relevant that each
man in the series is similar in height to his neighbor, it is not the case that each man in the
series is such that it 1.8 relevant that he is similar in height to his neighbor. The claim would
be that 'it is relevant that' does not commute inward across the universal quantifier. What
is at issue is whetber it can be argued that relevance is not closed under consequence-
whether it may be relevant that a universal holds, without each of its instances being such
that it is relevant that titey do. Nevertheless, it just seeIll8 to me wrong-headed to deny that
'Nhen confronted with the sorites series, (it needn't be in person), each man is relevantly
similar to his neighbor. Perhaps we are unable, because of our limited capacities, to actively
hold before our minds the similarity of each adjacent pair at anyone given time. I can see
no reason, though, why the active consideration of a fact should be a necessary condition
of its relevance.
What then are we to do? If the similarity of every pair is relevant then the standard
of use for 'tall' in that context must be one such that either every man meets the standard
or every man fails to meet the standard. But we also have what I called the normative
constraint on standards, which in this case rules out a standard that the shortest man
meets, but also rules out a standard that the tallest man does not Ineet. In this context,
every potential standard of use for 'tall' is ruled out by some constraint. The conclusion we
must draw, then, is that in this context sentences containing 'tall' express no proposition
at all. This lnay be very difficult to swallow. Isn't it true that the last man in the series is
tall? And mustn't the claim that he is tall, then, say that something is the case? Well if you
can say truly that the last man in the series is tall, then you must somehow be managing
to ignore the similarity of at least one pair in the series. Otherwise, your inclination to
regard the sentence as true must be accounted for by the strong pull of the normative
constraints, the feeling of obligation that it places on you to adopt a standard which the
last man meets. I do not think it should be an entirely unwelcome consequence of my view
that when confronted with a sorites series, sentences containing vague predicates express
no propositions. Didn't you feel that thinking about the Sorites paradox somehow screws
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things up?
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Another worry about the proposal will be that it does not really provide an explanation, in
the way suggested, of our inability to locate the boundaries for vague predicates. Perhaps
it is the case, the objection would run, that as long as we are unaware of the way in which
our standards of use for vague predicates are constrained by context-perhaps as long as
we are unaware of this, we will be unable to locate the boundaries of those standards, as
a consequence of our lack of awareness that as we shift the focus of our attelltion, the
standards in use of our predicates may change. But if we acknowledge that our standards
change as we shift the focus of our attention, then we should have no reason to believe,
just because the boundary between the tall and the not tall is not here, given my present
standards, that it was not here, given my previous standards. Shouldn't we, moreover j while
in a context c, be able to introduce a context-invariant predicate 'tallc ' that expresses just
the same property that 'tall' does in c? I may ~·:J.Y to myself, "I shall always use 'tallnow ' with
just the same standards with which I use 'tall' now." As I proceed to focus my attention
on what was then the boundary for 'tall', I will, by stipulation, be focusing my attention
on what is still the boundary for 'tallnow '. What explanation is there for my inability to
recognize this boundary as the boundary for 'tallnow ', and hence as the boundary for 'tall'
as I used it then?
Our response is that our only means of insight into what the standards are for
'tallnow ', is reflection upon what our standards were for 'tall' when 'tallnow ' was introduced.
Suppose, for reductio, that the cut-off height for 'tallnow ' is at 6'1. In order, therefore, for
me to know that the cut-off height for 'tallnow ' is at 6'1, I would have to have known then
that 6'1 was the cut-off height for 'tall'. But if I kJleW it, I believed it. And if I believed
that the cut-off height for 'tall' was at 6'1, then the similarity of heights of 6'1 and 6'1 - e
would have been relevant. So by the relevant sirailarity constraint for 'tall', 6'1 was not
the cut-off point. Contradiction. Note: I do not claim that everrthing we believe, or even
know, at a time is relevant at that time. Quite the opposite, in fact. In order for our use
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of vague terms to be successful, that is, to express properties, we are required to ignore-
put out of our minds-at least some of what we know. Knowledge is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for relevance. The principle appealed to in the reductio, was just the
more restricted claim that certain beliefs are sufficient for the relevance of certain facts,
specifically, that a belief of two similar heights that they straddle the boundary for 'tall',
would be sufficient to make the similarity of those heights relevant.
3.3 The Pragmatics of Indeterminacy
So far I have left open the questioll of whether borderline cases lead to truth-value gaps.
Nothing in my answers to questions one, two and four depended on it. But still, it seems
that implicit in my account of the context-dependence of vague predicates, is a conception
of what it is for an object a to be a borderline case of a predicate F that is compatible with
r ,
either or the truth or falsity of a is F . In fact, there seems to be more than one such
conception implicit in my account. On the one hand, I agreed with Williamson that that
we are essentially ignorant of the extent of the applicability of vague predicates. In every
context in which 'tall', for example expresses a property at all, there will be a least height
that is a tall height,7 and we cannot know which height that is. We cannot believe a height
h to be the least tall height without it becoming relevant that a just slightly shorter height
is too similar to h for it to fallon the other side of the boundary. So perhaps I should
say, with Williamson, that what seemed to be indeterminacy is really a form of ignorance.
On the other hand, I could adopt an idea of Crispin Wright's (1992), that what what it
is for something to be a borderline case of a predicate is for it to be permissible but not
mandatory to say that the predicate applies, and hence that two people may disagree about
whether the predicate applies without either being guilty of a "cognitive shortcoming." If
we have intuitions about whether it makes sense to think of something's being a borderline
case in a context, or whether the notion of a borderline case is something that requires
quantification over contexts, then we might be able to decide in favor of one or the other
7Or a greatest height that is a Dot-tall height.
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conception.
When trying to answer the question what is it for something to be a borderline case
of a vague predicate, I think it important to wgin by saying just what phenomenon it is
we are trying to account for. Some philosophers, such as Fine and Tappenden, just define
borderline cases as these things of which a predicate is neither true nor false. Timothy
Williamson regards it as better to proceed by giving examples. The first approach will
not do since then it remains an open question whether vague predicates do have borderline
cases, and so if vagueness is then defined as the possibility of having borderline cases, it
would remain an open question whether any predicates are vague. liVilliamson's approach
will not do either, since it seems impossible to find examples about which people can agree.
We are prompted to regard a thing as a borderline case of a predicate when it
elicits in us one of a variety of related verbal behaviors. When asked, for example, whether
a particular man is nice, we may give what may be called a hedging response. Hedgillg
responses include: "He's nice-ish," "Well, it depends on how you look at it," "I wouldn't
say he's nice, I wouldn't say he's not nice," "It COllld go either way," "He's kind of in
between," "It's not that cut and dry,1) and even, "He's a borderline case." If it is demanded
that a 'yes' or 'no' response is required, we may feel that neither answer would be correct,
or that we are just unable to decide. In other cases, it may be that one person says that
the man is nice, another says he is not, while we as third-party onlookers neither person is
wrong, and yet it can't be that both are right.
In asking what it is for something to be a borderline case of a predicate, I think
we should ask what might prompt one of this array of responses. There is no j1LQtification
for assuming at the outset that it is always the same thing in every case. In fact, I think
hedging responses may have a variety of causes.
Suppose you have been mugged, and are trying to provide a description of your
assailant to the police. You are asked whether the man is bald. If the man had had no
hair, you would most certainly respond 'yes', while if he had had a full head of hair you
would most certainly respond 'no'. But the map. was somewhere in the middle, so instead
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you try to give as detailed a description of his hair cover as would be helpful. But now
suppose you are on the witness stand, and are asked by the defense attorney whether your
assailant was bald. You are permitted only to answer 'yes' or 'no', on pain of being in
contempt of court. (The judge is strict to a fault.) You may find it difficult to answer one
way the other, since either answer would be misleading. Given Grice's (1989) maximum of
quantity: "Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes
of the exchange)," a simple yes answer would lead your audience to believe that 'bald' is a
sufficiently informative description of his hair cover, and hence they would be led to believe
that your assailant is a prototypical bald man. Similar remarks may be made for a simple
'no' answ"er. Despite the odd rules governing interrogation of witnesses, conversational
maxims remain in force. Thus in this case, neither 'yes' or 'no' would be a correct answer,
not because neither would be corre~t, but because each would have a false implicature. With
a more reasonable judge presiding, one who required 'yes' or 'no' answers of witnesses, but
who also permitted qualifications or elaborations, you might find that a 'no' answer would
come much more easily since you would be permitted to cancel the implicature of a simple
'yes' or 'no': "Well, no he's not bald, but he does have a rather large bald spot in back."
I do not claim that every hedging response is a reault of 'yes' or 'no' answers having
false implicatures. But this does seem to me to be the most common cause of hedging
responses that occur in the course of normal conversations. I should confess, though, that I
must be far more opinionated than most philosophers who write about vagueness, because
I find borderline cases very hard to come by. Nearly always I feel, when presented with a
putative borderline case of a vague predicate, that if really pressed to give a simple 'yes' or
'no' answer, I would not have too much trouble deciding which one was correct. If pressed,
I would say tllat the cover of The Logical Easis of Metaphysics is red.
If pres~ntedwith a sorites series of men varying in heights by small increments from
the short to the tall, and if asked, in order, of each man whether he is short, I can imagine (I
can only imagine since of course I have never been presented with such a series) that when
my 'yes' answers finally give out, they wo'uld not be immediately followed by 'no' answers.
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Instead, at some point, I would just feel it impossible to say either way. My feeling of
discomfort at having to decide the question would not be prompted by the fear of false
implicature-I can imagine that my audience is very good at ignoring implicatures. What
then is the cause of it? We have really already provided an answer to this question. My
discomfort is the result of being in an environment in which no standard of use of 'short'
could satisfy every constraint.
In the situation in which t\\,O people disagree about whether a vague predicate applies
to a given object, and it seems to a third party, adjudicating "from above," that there is
no fact of the matter about who is right, we have yet another explanation of the cause of
the hedging. It may be that the participants to the dispute are each correct, because there
may be license in the choice of standards to be adopted. Each has his own standard, and
is correct in applying that standard. The onlooker is prompted to hedge, since there is no
way of expressing this without going meta-linguistic.

Chapter 4
PhenoDlenal Continua and the
Sorites
I would like to concillde with a discussion of a version of the paradox to which I would
not wish to extend my solution. Imagine we have thirty color patches, eaell of which
looks homogeneously colored, arranged in a row such that each patch looks the same as
its neighbor(s), and yet the first patch looks red and the last patch does not look red.
(Suppose it looks orange.) By hypothesis, then, the first premise of the argument below
is true, the conclusion is false, and the antecedent of each instance of the second premise
is true whenever the two patches are adjacent. Yet the reasoning which takes us from the
premises to the conclusion is iInpeccable.
Patch # 1 looks red
If two patches look the same in color, then if one looks red e,o does the other
Patch #1 looks the same as patch #2
Patch #2 looks the same as patch #3
Patch #29 looks the same as patch #30
Patch #30 looks red
The paradoxical nature of the argument need not turn on the vagueness of 'red'.
87
88 CHAPTER 4. PHENOMENAL CONTINUA AND THE SORITES
Tile argument might just as easily have been run with 'looks square' instead. One thing
disinctive about this argument is its use of the observational copula 'looks'.' But second, and
rnore importantly, the conditional premise of the argument is not really a tolerance principle
at all. It does not say that the applicability of 'looks red' will tolerate small changes in
apparent color; but rather that the applicability of 'looks red' will not vary when there is
no change in apparent color.
This second version of the paradox is in a way more paradoxical than the first,
because its second premise-its sorites premise-is even harder to give up.. If one patch
looks red, and another doesn't, then they do not look the same. End of story. The tolerance
principle for 'heap' may seem true, but the sorites premise for 'looks red' seems like a truism.
Someone who sincerely claimed that two patches looked the same and ye'~ that one looked
red and the other not, would not merely seem to be plainly mistaken, but also to be in a
state of confusion.
There are, though, different senses of 'looks', and it may be that the extent to
which the sorites premise for 'looks red' sounds like a truism varies accordingly. The sense
of 'looks' I have in mind here is that generally used for making observation reports. It is
the sense according to which I may truly say of a friend gently illuminated by a neon green
sign, in a dimly lit bar, that she looks green, whether or not I believe the ill-appearance of
her complexion to be due only to the sign. It is the sense according to which a thing may
change in look quite rapidly, while undergoing nothing we would naturally think of as a
change in it, as when I say, placing a paint sample against different backgrounds, "Now it
looks red ... Now it looks pink." It is the sense of 'looks' which may be explicitly relativized
to an observer, and according to which when one person says, "It looks very dark blue" and
another says, of the same thing, "It looks black to me," they do not contradict each other.
Following Frank Jackson, I will call this the "phenomenal" sense of looks. 1 Note
lSee Jackson (1977, ch. 2). I think we have the same sense in mind, but that does not mean that I am
cOl.lmitted to agreeing with everything he says about it. For example, Jackson (pp. 34, 36) considers the
tase of someone who is red color-blind-and describes the person as someone to whom red things look a
particular shade (or range of shades) of grey. (Whether anyone has ever had such a condition, or whether
such a condition is even physically possible should have no bearing on the point.) According to Jackson,
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that the sorites argument for 'looks red' (p. 87, above) is only paradoxical if just a single
observer is involved. There is no problem if patch #1 looks red to Amy, neighboring patches
look the same to Sue, and patch #30 looks orange to Tim, since one cannot infer anything
about the way a patch looks to Tim from the way other patches (or even the same patch)
look to Amy and Sue. If different observers were involved in the above argument, we would
simply reject the reasoning as invalid. This could be made explicit bv using subscripts. So,
for example, 'Patch #2 looksAmy red' cannot be inferred from 'Patch #1 looksAmy red' and
'Patch #1 lookssue the same as patch #2,.2
But if we suppose that there is just one observer to whom patch # 1 looks red,
neighboring patches look the same, and patch #30 looks orange (and hence not the same
as patch #1), then we really do have a problem. The problem is that it follows from this
supposition that 'looks the same as' is non-t"l'ansitive. If an object which looks red and an
object which looks orange can be "connected" by a chain of objects, each of which looks
the same as its immediate neighbors, then it had better not be the case that whenever
an object a bears the 'looks the same as' relation to an object b, then if a looks red then
b does, since the conditional is transitive. Rather than reject the truism, I will, in what
follows, argue against the non-transitivity supposition. I will argue, that is, that objects
which look different (in our case a red patch and an orange patch) cannot be connected by
a looks-the-same-as chain.
Reconsider the supposition which entailed non-transitivity and thus led to paradox,
nothing looks red, in the phenomenal sense, to such a person. But it seems that such a person could truly
say to a friend in a dimly lit bar, under the glow of a red neon sign, that she looks red. Although he could
also truly say, in just the same situation, perhaps if describing his disability, that she looks grey. It might
be temptinl!: to conclude that there are two different senses of 'looks' that are used for making observation
reports. But though this may be so, it is the wrong conclusion to draw in this case. The right thing to
say, it seems to me, is that only a single sense of llooks' is involved here, and that whether it is true to say
that things look red or only that they look grey, in this one sense, to the color-blind person is something
that varies with the context of utterance, in particular with whether or not his disability is relev;:ln~ to the
discussion. Furthermore, 1 think there is room, within the view .Jackson presents in Perception J'J.:.:-}, r-pt~ng
such a position. At any rate, the issue will not be one that is pertinent to the present disCUSSl'l..·,u ..
21 assume that when 'looks' is used in the phenomenal sense, it must be relativized to an observer,
implicitly if not explicitly, which is to say that every utterance of a sentence i a looks F' has the same
truth-conditions as some explicitly relativized sentence' a looks F to b'.
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namely, that the following hold:
1. Patch # 1 looks red
2. Patch #n looks the same as patch #n + 1 (for each positive n < 30)
3. Patch #30 does not look red, it looks orange
Remember, we are assuming, so as not to make the sorites argument for 'looks red' just
trivially fallacious, that only a single observer, call her 'Olivia', is involved. One scenario
which would support 1-3 is the following: Olivia is shown patch #1, and it looks red to her;
then she is shown patch #30 and it looks orange; then she is shown each of the twenty-nine
pairs of adjacent patches ill succession (not necessarily in order), and each pair looks the
same. But if this is the scenario which is taken to support 1-3, then it cannot be concluded
that 'looks the same as' is not transitive. Concluding, from the scenario, that 'looks that
same as' is not transitive, would be like concluding that 'is taller than' is not transitive from
the followirlg: Michael is taller than GrahalD (in 1990); Graham is taller thall Dan (in 1985);
and Dan is taller than Michael (in 1995). Just as we have no reason to presume that Dan's
height when compared to Graham's in 1985 is the same as his height when compared to
Michael's in 1995, we have no reason to presume, if Olivia is shown the pairs in succession,
that patch #15, say, looks the same when it is presented with patch #14 as it does when
presented with patch #16. In particulaI, we have no reason to suppose that if patch #15
looks red when it is presented with patch #14, then it also looks red when presented with
patch #16-there is no license to carryover the "middle term."
This in essence is Jackson's respOIlSe to the claim that 'looks the sanie as' is not
transitive (1977, p. 113).3 But, as Jackson goes on quite rightly to point out, if there is a
single tirne at which 1-3 above hold, say as Olivia suz"veys the entire series of patches at
once, then we must after all conclude that 'looks the same as' is not transitive.4 To this
Jackson replies that such a situation is logically impassible. He has been, however, virtually
alone in his opinion.
3 Although he puts the point in terms of sense data, and to a different end from mine here
4Just as if there were a single time at which Michael were taller than Graham, Graham taller than Dan,
and Michael not taller than Dan, we would have to conclude that 'is taller than' is not transitive.
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Indeed, Crispin Wright (1975, pp. 345-47) has purported to prove that there could
not be apparently continuous change--phenomenal continua-if Llooks the saIne as' were
transitive. But even without a proof, it is fairly easy to convince people that 'looks the
same as' is not transitive. Just tell this story: "Suppose you have a color spectrum, ranging
from red on one end, and looking to change continuously to orange on the other. Now you
could cut the spectrum up into small enough strips, so tha l - each strip looked homogeneous
in color. Each strip will then look the same as its immediate neighbor(s), but the end strips
will not look the same. Whether or not the strips are viewed in sllccession, or all at once,
has no effect on the situation, so 'looks the same as' must be non-transitive. In fact, the
strips don't really need to be thought of as cut-outs, but just as regions of the original
spectrum." Convincing as this story may be, I shall provide reasons for siding with Jackson
against Wright.
Let us examine the above story. It consists of three claims amounting to the follow-
ing, the last of which is supposed to be the conclusion of an argument:
1. There are (or could be) phenomenal continua-changes in color across a spectrum,
for example, which look like continuous changes.
2. SOla11 enough. regions of phenomenal continua look homogeneous.
3. 'Looks the same as' is not transitive with respect to regions of phenomenal continua:
adjacent regions look the same, but the end regions do not look the same.
The argument for the conclusion can J.e construed in two ways. One construal
is this: what is required for a change in color to look continuous is that narrow enough
regions of the spectrum look homogeneous in color; and that if narrow enough regions look
homogeneous in color, then adjacent regions must look the same. The thought here is that
(1) may be assumed; it entails (2); and together (1) and (2) entail (3). I will call this the
simple thought. On the other hand, the argument could be construed in the following way:
given that when change in color on a spectrum looks continuous, narrow enough regions of
the spectrum look homogeneous in color, it must be that narrow enough adjacent regions
on the spectrum look the same in color, even though the end regions do not look the same.
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The idea here is that (1) and (2) may each be assumed, and together they entail (3) I will
call this the speculative thought.
The simple thought is mistaken-it reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of
continua. To see this, it is perhaps ~asier to consider the analogous case of continuous
motion. Say we have an object moving in one direction along a straight line.5 In order for
the IL l)tion to be continuous, it is not required that for adjacent illtervals of time I and J,
even very small ones, the object be in the same place during I that it is in during J. Indeed,
it is not required that the object remain in a single place during any time-span longer than
an instant.6 And if this is not required to be the case in order for the object to be moving
continuously, why should it be required to look the case in order for the object to look to
be moving continuously?
What is required for continuous motion is that for any positive distance c, 110 matter
how small, there is a positive amount of time 0 which is small enough so that during any
time-span of length 0, the object moves less than c in that time-span. 7 What is required for
motion to look continuous, then, is presumably that for any distance E, no matter how small,
there is a positive amount of time 6 which is small enough so that during any time-span
of lengtll d, the object looks to move less than E in that time-span-in other words, given
any distance you like, no matter how small, there's some short enough time-span in which
the object always looks to cover less than that distance. Analogously, for change in color
to look continuous, it is required only that given any positive amount of change in color,
there is a narrow enough width such that in any region of that width on the spectruID, the
color looks to change less than that amount in that region. Crucially, it i~ not required that
any region, however narrow, look either homogeneous in color, or the same as its immediate
5Just as we may think '1)[ the motion of the object as a function which, given a time as argument, yields
the location of the object at that time as value, we may think of change in color along the spectrum as a
function which, given a point on the spectrum as argument, yields the color of the spectrum at that point
as value. The continuity of either motion or change in color can then be identified with what it is for these
respective fUDctions to be continuous.
6 And in order for the intervals to be adjacent, it is required that at least one of them be longer than an
instant.
7We are here assuming that the c,bject is in some location or other at each moment-that it never ceases
to exist.
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neighbors.
The speculative thought, in contrast, is not so obviously mistaken. If, as a matter
of fact of human perception, small enough changes in color, or in location, are perceived by
us as being no change at all, then it does seem right to conclude that adjacent regions of
the spectrum, when they are small enough, must look the same in order for change in color
to look continuous; and that in adjacent intervals of time, when they are small enough, a
moving object must look the same in respect of position.
It is tempting to argue as follows: If on the color spectrllm, as a matter of fact of
human perception, small enough regions of the spectrum look homogeneous, then adjacent
such regions must look the same or we would see an abrupt change in color somewhere.
Anyone who is tempted by this argument, though, betrays a proclivity for transitivity.
The defender of non-transitivity ml1st deny that all adjacent, homogeneous-looking patches
look the same. Here's why: if for some narrow width w, all regions narrower than w look
homogeneous, then there is a greatest such width-call it Wmax • Now consider some width
w' that is less than Wmax , but greater than wmax/2. By hypothesis, all regions of width
w' look homogeneous. But if each pair of adjacent regions of width w' looked the same as
eacll other, then all regions of width 2w' would look homogeneous. This contradicts our
original assumption since 2w' is greater than W max . So even if, as a matter of fact of human
perception, small enough regions of the spectrum look homogeneous, it cannot be that all
adjacent such regions look the same.
A stronger argument for the validity of the speculative thought goes like this: given
that for some narrow width, all regions less than that width look homogeneous, then if we
divide any such region into two, the two will look the same. For if they do not look the
same then the original region cannot look homogeneous. Given also that distant enough
regions do not look the same, non-tran."itivity clearly follows.
I accept this stronger argument for the validity of the speculative thought, and
instead wish to question its soundness. I will begin by highlighting a certain absurdity
which comes with accepting its conclusion that 'looks the same as' is not transitive. I will
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then proceed by showing that the grounds typically offered, or assumed, in support of its
premises are not conclusive ones.
We already have reason to be wary of the claim that 'looks the same as' is not transitive,
namely, that if we accept it, we cannot consistently accept what seems to be a truism: If
two color patches look the same, then if one looks red so does the other. But even if we set
aside this unwelcome consequence, a little reflection will reveal the claim to be implausible.
I consider first the case of 'looks the same as' in respect of position. If this relation were
genuinely non-transitive, then it should be possible for us to place three stationary objects
in such a way that the first looked in the same position as the second, th~ second in the same
position as the third, with the first and the third not looking to be in the same positions.
But we cannot, or so I will presently argue.
In Wang's Paradox, Michael Durnmett discusses a very coarse observer. This is
"someone with a vision so coarse that it can directly discriminate only four distinct positions
in the visual field ... : that is, it is not possible to arrange more than four objects, big enough
for this person to see, so that he can distinguish between their position" (Dummett 1975,
p. 267). Adding some detail to the example, we will suppose that this coarse observer
cannot distinguish hand-positions on a clock that are separated by an angle of less tllan
90°, but can distinguish positions that are separated by an angle of greater than 90°. By
hypothesis, then 'looks in the same position as' is non-transitive for this observer, since a
hand at twelve o'clock will look in tha same position as a hand at two o'clock, which will
in turn look in the same position as a hand at four o'clock. But the outer hands will not
look in the same position.8
8Dummett introduces the example in order to argue that, although the identity criterion for phenomenal
qualities proposed by Nelson Goodman is perfectly well defined (see Goodman (1977, ch. IX, §2)), it is not
an identity criterion for anything we would normally think of as a phenomenal quality. The criterion as
applied to the present case will yield the intuitively wrong result that even for the very coarse observer, there
are continuum-many phenomenal positions. Given Goodman's criterion, two hands on the clock, however
close, will be phenomenally distinct for the very coarse observer since a third hand placed less than 900 from
one but more than 90° from the other will look in the same position as the one but not as the other.
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I claim that no such coarse observer is possible. According to those who maintain
that for us, 'looks in the sanle position as' is non-transitive, the only difference between
us and the very coarse observer is but a difference of degree. For the coarse observer, the
minimally discriminable angle between clock hands is 90°, while for us it is supposed to be
some much lesser angle. So if the coarse observer cannot possibly exist, then since we do
exist, we are not coarse observers.
Suppose we place three hallds on the clock-one at t\velve o'clock, one at two o'clock,
and one at four o'clock-and ask the very coarse observer to tell us what he sees. By
hypothesis, the middle hand looks to him to be in the same position as both of the outer
hands, which in turn look to be in different positions. Suppose also that the hands are
each the same size, and completely opaque. Then two hands will look in the same position
just in case one looks to completely obstruct the other. Since the two outer hands look in
different positions, neither looks to completely obstruct the other. Will the observer see the
middle hand, or not? Well, if he does see it, then it must look to completely obstruct both
of the other hands, since by hypothesis it looks to be in the same position as both. But if
the middle hand looks to obstruct both of the other harlds, then he will not be able to see
them, and hence they cannot look to be in different positions, contrary to the supposition.
If the coarse observer does not see the Iniddle hand, it is not because he has blindspots-
were we to place a hand at two o'clock, and one at five o'clock, he would see both since by
hypothesis they would look to be in different positions. If he does not see the third hand,
then it is because it looks completely o"bstructed by at least one of the other two. If the
observer knows there is a third hand, then he may say that it looks in the same position as
one of tht, other two. But he cannot say which, because it is obstructed. What he cannot
say is that it looks to be completely obstructed by both of the othtr two hands, since by
hypothesis these look to him to be in different positions.
Suppose now that the hands are not opaque but translucent, so that all three may
be seen even if one is obstructed. Let the hand at twelve o'clock be translucent red, the
one at two o'clock be translucent yellow, and the one at four o'clock be translucent blue.
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Now when one hand obstructs another, both will still be visible. When the red and yellow
hands look in the same position, together they will look like a single orange hand.9 Now
what will the coarse observer see? Well, the red hand looks to him in one position, call it
X, and the yellow hand looks also to be in X, so at X he will set; a single orange hand. The
blue hand looks in a different position from the red one, call it Y, but the yellow hand also
looks in the same position as the blue, so it looks to be in Y, so at Y he will see a single
green hand. Thus, if we ask him what position the yellow hand looks to be in, he will say
it looks to be in two places at once! But if it is only in virtue looking to be in two positions
that the yellow hand can look to be in the same position as the other two, then all bets are
off-since if the red hand (or the blue lland) does not look to be in two positions at once,
then it does not look the same in respect of position as the yellow han~d.
It cannot he objected, against my considerations, that we have no reason to presume
to be able to understand the very coarse observer-no reason to presume to be able to make
sense of ~hat he says he sees. If the proponent of non-transitivity were right, we should
have just the same experiences as the very coarse observer (only in cases where the hands
weJ:"e much closer together), and hence be able to make perfect sense of \vhat he says he
sees. Given the foregoing considerations, we must reject the possibility of a very coarse
observer. We are to reject, that is, tIle possibility that any being (us included), can have a
visual experience as of three objects, one of which looks in the same position as both of the
other two, when the other two do not look in the same position.
I now propose that the non-transitivity of 'looks the same color as' stands or falls
with the non-transitivity of 'looks in the same position as'. If the latter is implausible, so
is the former. Suppose we have a series of color patches arranged horizonta.lly, each patch
set in a vertical track which allows us to slide it individually up and down. Now certainly
it should always be possible to carry out the following instruction: Place tile patches along
their tracks so that two patches look in the same vertical position if and only if they look
9This can be made more plausible by supposing that the clock is a two-dimensional one, say on a computer
screen.
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the same in respect of color. If 'looks the same as' in respect of position is not transitive,
then we cannot place three patches so that the first looks in the same vertical position as
the second, the second in the same position as the third, but the first and tile third not in
the same position. But then if we have carried out our instruction, there cannot be three
patches for which 'looks the same as' in respect of color is not transitive either.
The question to which we now turn is: must we accept the premises on which the speculative
thought rests? Must we, despite the implausibility of the non-transitivity of 'looks the same
as', accept the two claims which entail it? Let us address the second premise (p. 91, above)
first. Is it true, in the case of apparently continuous change in color, that narrow enough
regioIW of the spectrum will always look homogeneous? And is it true, in the case of
apparently continuous change in position, that in small enough intervals of time, a moving
object will look to remain in a single place? Wright, well aware that this assumption is
required in the argument for the non-transitivity of 'looks the same as', describes it as a
"very natural presupposition." To suppose otherwise, he writes, would be to suppose that
"we have infinite powers of discrimination ... , that we can always directly discern some
distinction more minute than any discerned so far" (Wright 1975, p. 346).
In order to address the present question, we need to examine what justification there
might be for taking as given that small enough changes in color or position are perceived
by us as no changes at all. In the case of color, the justification seems to be that we can
actually cut up the spectrum into regions which look homogeneous; or that we can cover up
all but an inch of the spectrum, and be left with a region that looks homogeneolls; or even
that we can leave the entire spectrum exposed and intact, and still judge of narrow regions
of it, looking from one to another, that they each look homogeneolls. Unfortunately, this
justification is no~ very good-it provides us only with a 'can' from which is concluded a
'must'. It is certainly true that regions of the spectrum may sometimes look homogeneous,
especially when attention is focused on them in some way. But that is no reason to suppose
that there is any width such that regions of the spectrum less than that width always looks
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homogeneous. If you take a foot-long spectrum ranging from red on the left (~O orange on
the rigllt, place it about two feet ahead of you, and stare at the red edge of it for a few
seconds, soon nearly the entire spectrum will look homogeneously red. But just because a
two-thirds region of the spectrum can look homogeneously red, does not mean that it must,
as one can verify by focusing one's attention somewhere nearer the middle.
In the case of position, the justification for taking as given that small enough changes
are perceived by us as no changes at all seems to be that sometimes objects move so slowly
that they it seems they look still-take the moon, or the hour-hand on a clock. The thought
is that if a moving object seems to look still during an interval, then it must be because \ve
cannot visually distinguish any of the positions it is in during that interval-the reason it
seems to look still is that our ability to discriminate does not extend to positions that are
too close together.
Though this may be a plausible explallation of why when we look at tht; hour-hand
on a clock, it seems to look still, it is not the only explanation. Another explanation,
consistent with transitivity, is that when we look at the hour-hand on a clock, although it
does in fact look to change in position, the change in appearance is too slight, and too slow,
for us to notice it. It should not be objected that the distinction introduced here is an ad
hoc one, tailored to the present purpose, since it is a distinction naturally invoked in other
cases. SU"lpose a friend whom I see daily comes up to me and says, expectantly, "Do I look
different?" I may be unable to discover any change in her appearance. Still, once she goes
on to tell me that she has lightened her hair (say), I may be able to tell that, yes, her hair
color does look different than it did the day before. Yet it seems wrong to say that her
hair color looked different to me only after I was informed of the change. Instead, it looked
different all along, but only after being informed did I notice it. My inability to discover
the change, prior to being informed, was not a visual failinl?; but a cognitive one.
So at present we have two competing explanations of what is going on when the
hour-hand of a clock seems to look stilL The first explanation is that when the hL ar-hand
looks still, say for a period of a minute, it looks in t~:e same position at the end of the
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minute as at the start. The alternative explanation is that when the hour-hand looks still,
although it does not look in the same position at the end of the minute as at the start, we
do not notice this. Noticing the change in apparent position requires not only that there
be an apparent change, but also that we believe there to be one. A reason for deciding in
favor of the latter explanation is this: If we look at the hour-hand for enough time, say five
minutes, we will realize that it looks to be in a different position from the one in which it
started. But the suddenness with which we realize this is much more plausibly accounted
for as the sudden formation of a belief, rather than a sudden change in look.
I have now given reasons for suspecting that we do not have conclusive grounds for
premise (2) of the speculative thought. On the one hand this should be welcome, since
together with (1), (2) entails a claim we should regard as implausible. But on the other
hand, don't we have to suppose (2) to be true? As Wright said, to suppose otherwise would
be to suppose that we have infinite powers of discrimination.
Assuming there are phenomenal continua, Wright is correct on this score. For let
us suppose that we do have only finite powers of discrimination-that, for example, as an
object moves from the left of our visual field to the right, it passes through only finitely
many visibly distinct positions. Does it follow, as Wright claims it follows, that for some
small distance, whenever the object traverses that distance, it looks as if it does not change
position at all? Suppose the visibly distinct positions in our visual field number only {our-
call them A, B, C, and D. Now by hypothesis, whenever an object moves within any of
these regions it looks still. It might nonetheless be that when an object moves from one
region to another, no matter how small the distance it traverses, it does look to change
position. But then the motion could not look continuous. It would instead look like there
were discrete changes in the position of the object-like a cursor on a conlputer screen,
which IOI'.)kj to "jump" from one character position to the next. So if we do have finite
powers of discrimination, premise (2) of the speculative thought is trtle.
But can we really be sure that motion does in fact ever look continuous to us? Can
we be sure, that is, that premise (1) of the speculative thought is true? After all, if there
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really are only finitely many visibly distinct positions in 011£ visual field, there are very
many more than four of them. Motion certainly strikes us as continuous-looking. But can
we be sure, when an object passes before us, that it does not really look as if it is moving
discoJ ..~inuously, looking to take very tiny discrete jumps? And can we be sure, when looking
at a color spectrum, that it does not really look to change discontinuously from red on the
left to orange on the right? Can we be sure that the spectrum does not really look, say, like
one million very narrow, homogeneously-colored vertical stripes, each looking not the same
as, but just slightly different from its immediate neighbors? I do not see that we can be at
all sure of these things.
Imagine we could have both of the foilowing two visual experiences: the first, of a
cursor on a computer screen looking to move discontinuously from one character position
to the next; the second, of a cursor on a computer screen looking to move continuously,
but jerkily, from one character position to the next-looking to move very quickly between
character positions, and looking to pause momentarily in each character position. Clearly,
the motion of the cursor cannot look the same in the two cases, since looking to move
discontinuously is inconlpatible with looking to move cOlltinuously. But as I watch the
cursor on my computer screen moving before me now, I cannot be sure that I am having
one of these experiences and not the other. Although continuous-but-very-jerky-Iooking
motion is different from discontinuous-and-very-jerky-Iooking motion, it would seem that
they would not really strike us as being different. Both would strike us as discontinuous-
looking.
Similarly, imagine we could have the following two experiences: the first, of a cursor
on a computer screen looking to move discontinuously from one pixel to the l\ext (suppose
also that pixels are incredibly small); the second of the cursor looking to move continuously,
but jerkily from one pixel to the next. Again, the two experiences, although different, would
not strike us as being different. Both would strike us as experiences of continuous-looking
motion.
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What position should we now take with respect to the argument I called the speculative
thought? Its conclusion, that 'looks the same as' is not transitive, I argued to be implausible:
on the one hand because were it true, we could not accept that if two things look the same,
then if one looks red (say) so does the other; on the other hand, because to accept it would
be to accept that there could be very coarse observers of the kind Dummett discusses, and
this it seems there cannot be. We should therefore reject at least one of the premises on
which the speculative thought rests. I have argued that tIle grounds typically offered for
each are not conclusive. Nevertheless, if we do not have infinite powers of discrimination,
then we must, as Wright says, accept premise (2), in which case (1) should be rejected.
This seems like a sensible position to take anyway: if we really have only finite powers of
discrimination, how could there be phenomenal continua? If, in contrast, our powers of
discrimination are infinite, then we are free to reject premise (2), since what I called the
simple thought is wrong; (2) is not entailed by (1).
Let us now return to the version of the paradox considered at the outset of this
section.
Patch #1 looks red
If two patches look the same, then if one looks red so does the other
Patch #1 looks the same as patch #2
Patch #2 looks the same as patch #3
Patch #29 looks the same as patch #30
Patch #30 looks red
I submit that the argument is not after all paradoxical. It only seems paradoxical
when it is assumed that there can be a sorites series of the required sort for 'looks red', a
series the first and last members of which look different, while adjacent members look the
same. Although the existence of such a series is not, as Jackson thought, logically impossible,
we do not have sufficient reason to believe that such a series could exist, and hence may
with peace of mind accept the claim that if two patches look the same, then if one looks
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red so does the other.
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